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Introduction

1

“[T]he ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the
capacity to dictate who may live and who must die. Hence, to kill or to allow to live constitute
the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental attributes” (Mbembe 2003, 11).
Callouses and Construction
Pausing with my knuckles inches from the door, I quickly ran through the checklist that
counselors like myself had been provided to help patients at a local free clinic manage their
chronic conditions. Today, I was seeing one of my first patients, a man in his late forties with
hypertension. So, having mentally reviewed the recommendations aimed at curbing sodium
intake, I knocked. Seated across from a friendly face moments later, I introduced myself before
going through my suggestions, met with his constant smile and occasional nods. When I finished
with my spiel, I asked for his thoughts. He looked at me silently for a few seconds. Carefully, he
then pulled his hands from his pockets, placing them in the air between us and turning his palms
towards me. “Look at them,” he said gently, as my eyes roved over their calloused surfaces
dotted with specks of the same paint and dirt that streaked his jeans. “Can you tell I work in
construction?” he chuckled after a moment. He told me about his work, sharing details of his
schedule packed to the brim, the quick trips to fast food joints during lunch, the physical
intensity of his labor, the financial task of supporting his family. Detail by detail, he rendered my
advice meaningless. His life beyond these clinic’s walls was filled with challenges, he showed
me, filled with structures my suggestions did not acknowledge and a slow violence I failed to
comprehend.
I remember this encounter in stark contrast to many of the sentiments and whispers I
heard around the clinic. Latinx patients like the man I had seen were tough to work with because
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of “cultural” diets, I heard. Some counselors and physicians remarked that non-compliance with
dietary regiments was a “culturally” encoded phenomenon. Others stepped in to correct their
colleagues. Adherence to dietary management routines, they suggested, was not only the more
appropriate terminology but was also difficult because Latinx “culture” did not inspire faith in
biomedical recommendations. Yet others lamented that Latinx health would significantly
improve if only providers were better trained in cultural competence. What did “culture” mean in
all these situations, I wondered? What did “culture,” as this versatile linguistic ambiguity,
explanatory justification, and barrier to seemingly overcome in the stride towards good care,
conceal? Most importantly, what were the dangers of this practice?
In this thesis, I explore the notion of explanatory necropolitics, the masking of structural
violence within the language of care. I seek to illustrate the way in which moralized conceptions
of “good care” have attempted to linguistically outmaneuver paternalistic connotations by
ostensibly accommodating patient autonomy and choice. However, these attempts have merely
displaced “compliance” into a new form of surveilling and depriving patients’ practical
sovereignty. This novel concept of adherent autonomy is not uniformly assessed, either. Some
patient collectives, or “cultures” are expected and assumed to behave in certain ways,
particularly in ways deviating from the biomedical ideal. “Culture” and “cultures” subsume
characteristics most salient in clinical encounters and become overwhelmingly explanatory,
concealing structural roots of inequities. In this way, they act as especially pernicious
necropolitical tools allowing the fracturing of populations into those whose slow death is not
only permitted but also normalized. Ultimately, I critique facile efforts of improving care and
elucidate performances of pseudocare that reinforce the biomedical hegemony and undermine
progress towards health equity.

6

To Care
While “care” and all its permutations—“careful” and “caring” among so many others—
are extraordinarily commonplace, the concept of care is difficult to pin down and define. This
does not mean, however, that no attempts have been made to achieve this goal. In fact, the
anthropology of care remains a rapidly expanding body of thought—one which aims to clarify
the many ways in which care manifests within and across cultures. One corner of this expansive
debate concerns the ethics of care, a notion originating from the work of Carol Gilligan, who
introduced the concept in response to Kohlberg’s model of moral development and the broader
theory of impartialism.
Impartialism proposes a constant set of ethical rules that can be applied to all situations
and all people in an objective manner. Gilligan’s conception of care differs from this body of
thought primarily as it views the “care approach [as] particularized… and involved” and “does
not see the person making moral decisions as a radically autonomous, self-legislating individual”
(Allmark 1995, 20). From this perspective, individuals cannot be expected to operate devoid of
interpersonal relationships, which greatly influence the way one interprets morality and “good
care.” Allmark also points out that moral decisions are not undertaken in an emotional vacuum
since, as Hume puts it, “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (Allmark 1995,
20). These concepts have increasingly framed care as labor with both technical and affective
components, each of which construct the relationship between the “one-caring” and the “caredfor.” This carefully governed dynamic becomes regulated by logics, or rationales, of care and
choice.

The Logics of Care and Choice
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In her landmark book titled The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient
Choice, Dutch political philosopher Annemarie Mol expounds care as a “collaborative and
continuing [attempt] to attune knowledge and technologies to diseased bodies and complex
lives” (Mol 2008). The moralized duty of care is both a technical action and an affective way of
acting which adapts its form to “rational explications of needs and sympathetic appreciation of
emotions” (Tronto 1998, 18). “Good care,” then, must contend with patient autonomy and
choice, which can result in tension. To best convey Mol’s point, I will defer to an example she
presents. Consider a patient in a psychiatric ward, she says, who wakes up one day and refuses to
get out of bed. What might the appropriate moral decision be for a psychiatrist in charge of this
patient? There is a logic of choice here, the rationality of allowing the patient to make their own
decision in the name of preserving their freedom. Simultaneously, however, there is an opposing
sentiment, one which reasons that “[o]ffering him the choice of staying in bed is as much a way
of neglecting him as forcing him to get up” (Mol 2008, xi).
To allow the patient to stay in bed honors their autonomy, an important socially defined
value, but may also be seen as an abdication of the duty to provide good care. This friction, Mol
argues, is why choice can complicate the delivery of care. While all clinical situations may not
be as stark or as ethically fraught as the example she presents, physicians must constantly
contend with patients’ freedom of choice in their construction of care. To be able to make these
judgments, care providers must “understand the complexity of the process in which they are
enmeshed” (Tronto 1998, 18). This point concerning intersubjectivity inspires my interest in
exploring how physicians negotiate with and explicate the logic of choice in care. As physicians
navigate patient autonomy to construct and perform “good care,” it becomes important to assess
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these ostensible accommodations for choice. A key examination begins with medicine’s growing
emphasis on addressing patient autonomy through non-paternalistic care.

The Language of Choice: Compliance and Competence
The concept—and label—of compliance is employed in clinical encounters where
patients are expected to follow a prescribed regimen. Increasingly, however, the phrase has
become contentious due to complaints that it upholds the imbalance of power between patients
and providers. Critics suggest that compliance promotes paternalistic care by overestimating
patients’ control of performing or doing what is asked of them. It thereby undermines the
delivery of “good care,” they contend, by leaving little room for patients’ decisions.
In response to these arguments, various medical institutions have begun promoting the
use of “adherence” instead of “compliance,” hoping to soften the language used to examine
patients’ actions. This modification forces the question, however, of whether the change in
terminology has also inspired an accompanying transformation of the way this concept is applied
and assessed in medical care. In particular, I ask how evaluations of compliance, adherence, or
“good” patient behavior can be unevenly assessed, expected, and punished, especially when
mediated by notions of “culture” and collectives as I have demonstrated in my opening vignette.

The Explanatory Necropolitics of Slow Death
As “non-compliance” is a decried as a problematic label due to its unfair determination of
complete patient agency and rational behavior, much attention has been paid to the creation of
seemingly homogeneous collectives in the name of “culture.” In her ethnographic work
9

Reproducing Race, which explores maternal care, anthropologist and lawyer Khiara Bridges
unpacks these collectives. She finds that physicians frequently speak about “non-compliance” as
a result of patient “culture,” exploiting the term’s ambiguity to justify its conflated use. In
treating patients not as individuals but as individuals from certain collectives, she suggests “it is
the population that is acted upon; those who make up the entity become nothing more than the
stuff through which the population can be touched, manipulated, and affected” (Bridges 2008,
146). These seemingly “cultural” populations are not only confused with racial and ethnic
categorizations, but they are also assigned imagined attributes used to explain and predict
behavior different from moralized conceptions of the biomedical ideal.
As I will explore in this thesis, assumed “cultural” collectives exploit the language of
choice to explain all patient behavior, but especially deviant behavior, in terms of autonomy and
norms. In this way, some groups are predicted to behave in certain ways and health outcomes,
too, are ascribed to these “culturally” directed actions. The downward prognosis of some
individuals therefore becomes normalized and even justified, revealing the necropolitical power
of these ostensibly explanatory collectives. The resulting slow death is “a violence that occurs
gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and
space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all,” making it especially
sinister (Nixon 2013, 2). Those who are insulated by whiteness, privilege, and power are left to
see slow death as a theoretical phenomenon, an inevitable and invisible casualty. However, to
those who are subject to this drawn-out violence, slow death is anything but imagined. This is the
dangerously concealed extension of structural violence that I seek to investigate through my
work.

10

My analysis of physician perspectives on the role of “culture” attempts to challenge the
pervasive reluctance to confront institutional policies and linguistic maneuvers not in the hopes
of demonizing individual providers or hospitals, but rather to establish routes towards equitable
care. Through critical reflection, I hope to illuminate the ways in which attempts to eliminate
disparities through adherence and competence may exploit established power dynamics to
further oppress rather than liberate individuals. In order to explore the concepts I have outlined
thus far, I narrow in on one form of clinical encounter: chronic disease management.

Chronic Disease Management
Chronic disease management serves as a valuable field of study for several reasons.
Firstly, it offers a particularly salient relationship with prescribed regimens and instructions. The
applications of compliance or adherence can frequently be observed during the treatment of
conditions like diabetes that may require patients to take medications, routinely check various
bodily parameters, and otherwise adhere to physician-provided instructions. This set of clinical
diseases is also a commonly encountered topic in clinics across the nation.
The American Diabetes Association, reports that 10.5% of the American population 34.2 million individuals - had diabetes in 2018 (American Diabetes Association 2018). Similarly,
a 2019 study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention revealed that almost half of
Americans - 108 million people - have hypertension. Both these conditions not only increase the
risk of potentially fatal heart disease, stroke, and other complications, but also continue to cost
the healthcare system trillions each year. While genetics and environmental factors play a
significant role in the genesis of these diseases, studies show that lifestyle modifications—
particularly dietary changes—may be sufficient to markedly decrease the conditions’ impact and
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prevalence (Lean et al. 2019, 344). For this reason, dietary changes are frequently incorporated
into patient-physician discussions of chronic disease management. However, these routines must
negotiate with a landscape plagued with systemic problems and inequities.
According to the United States Department of Agriculture, for example, a staggering
10.5% of American households - 5.3 million families - experienced food insecurity for all or part
of 2019 (USDA Economic Research Service 2019). Food insecurity is defined here as “access to
adequate food for active, healthy living ... limited by lack of money and other resources” (USDA
Economic Research Service 2019). This hunger epidemic is explained by a variety of social
determinants ranging from low wages to social isolation and disproportionately affects lowincome, Black, and Hispanic families (Feeding America 2020). The ability to enact dietary
changes or even access healthy food, therefore, is uneven across the patient population. This
disparity offers just one example of the structural factors with which chronic disease
management must contend.
The last factor that makes chronic disease management a pertinent field to investigate is
its long-standing relationship with dialogue concerning agency and sovereignty. This is
especially true for the dietary component of management, which social theorist Lauren Berlant
has discussed in extensive detail. Capitalist systems such as those we are surrounded by demand
and profit from longevity, not of life, but of the body. This is to say that the market depends on
an individual’s capacity to work and not so much on an individual’s ability to exist. As an
exploitative force, then, capitalism strips an individual of their practical sovereignty, or sense of
power, while shrinking the experience of life such that it “feels truncated—more like doggy
paddling than swimming out to the magnificent horizon” (Berlant 2007, 779). Subscribing to this
perspective reframes one’s understanding of food. Eating becomes more than breaking bread. It
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is in many ways an attempt at breaking or interrupting the temporal squeeze of daily life. It is an
attempt of self-abeyance, of “floating sideways,” of reclaiming that lateral agency and practical
sovereignty which permits an individual to, for even a moment, slow the constant forward rush
of life (Berlant 2007, 779).
Located at the intersection of these discussions, chronic disease management presents a
critical sphere for my research on explanatory necropolitics. While I began my research focused
on the dietary component of management, my work expanded to incorporate several facets of
these routines beyond food, as I will illustrate in the coming chapters.

Setting
I performed my research in the St. Louis region, an area that has a long and significant
history with racial, socioeconomic, and health inequities. These disparities are revealed by a
closer look at the region’s racial makeup, concentration of poverty, and rates of death from heart
disease. A 2015 report titled “For the Sake of All,” exemplified the mapping of these inequities
onto St. Louis County’s landscape, showing the existence of continued and tightly linked
geographic segregation of race, socioeconomic status, and health inequity (Purnell, Camberos,
and Fields 2015, 30).
The distribution of deaths from heart disease in St. Louis is especially relevant to my
work with chronic disease. Between 2014 and 2018, heart disease was the leading cause of death
in St. Louis county, taking an average of 2,436 lives annually (St. Louis Department of Public
Health 2020). A report by the Department of Public Health notes that Black residents are
“disproportionately affected by heart disease to a staggering degree, consistently having higher
mortality and hospital visit rates compared to other racial/ethnic groups in the county (St. Louis
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Department of Public Health 2020). While disparities in insurance and access to healthcare
contribute to these statistics, food insecurity plays an underappreciated role in these inequities as
well.
A 2019 study by the Missouri Coalition for the Environment, for example, revealed that
26.8% of St. Louis city residents, a staggering 85,400 individuals, were classified as food
insecure (Missouri Coalition for the Environment 2017). Stark racial divides dominate this
conglomerate statistic. Compared to 15.34% of white residents of St. Louis city, 38.41% of
Black residents live in poverty. In addition, 14% of white residents reported difficulty purchasing
healthy foods in their neighborhood whereas this number was 34% for Black residents (Missouri
Coalition for the Environment 2017). To underscore the distinction even further, one can look at
yet other factors that may impact food security. 30.9% of white city residents reported low
incomes and low food and vehicle access (Missouri Coalition for the Environment 2017). For
Black residents, this statistic was startlingly bleaker: 62.7% (Missouri Coalition for the
Environment 2017).
My aim in presenting this discussion of St. Louis County is to briefly underscore the
magnitude of structural violence that goes on within its boundaries. The racial and
socioeconomic discrimination that pervades the region and its citizens’ health is critical to my
analysis of explanatory necropolitics as it exemplifies the intensity of systemic power concealed
by the practices I present in the following chapters.

Methods
Since I was interested in the intersections of culture, compliance, and competence in the
field of chronic disease management, I reached out to physicians who would frequently
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encounter these conditions among their patients. This meant that I focused my efforts on
endocrinologists at first, recognizing that their interaction with conditions like diabetes would
make chronic disease management, nutrition, and diet common topics of counseling. From here,
I selected other interviewees through a process of snowball sampling. I asked each of my
interlocutors for the contact information of colleagues who they believed might be interested in
speaking with me for my project and emailed potential interviewees with information about my
study. With everyone I spoke to, I held a 30–45-minute virtual semi-structured interview probing
for their thoughts on the various concepts I hoped to explore. A few of the sample questions that
I asked my interlocutors are provided in the Appendix.
Over three months, I spoke with ten individuals: six endocrinologists, two primary care
physicians, one registered primary care nurse, and one bariatric surgeon. Interestingly, while I
reached out to a variety of providers, all my physician interviewees were female. These care
providers practiced in a variety of locations in the St. Louis region, with most alternating
between hospitals in St. Louis City and affiliate practices in West County. Many, by virtue of
their affiliation with a large teaching hospital and university, were engaged in training programs
and served dually as physicians and resident educators. Furthermore, several pursued public
health research and efforts to address disparities in their specialty. After all my interviews were
complete, I compiled my fieldnotes and reviewed physicians’ responses for qualitative patterns.
Placing these themes in conversation with burgeoning anthropological literature has allowed me
to present this analysis.

Outline
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In Chapter 2, I begin by exploring physicians’ framings of the term “compliance,” not
only to understand their ideas of what ideal management of chronic disease looks like, but also to
elucidate their conceptions of care. I review the ways in which the challenges of compliance, or
adherence, are deconstructed into coded components of knowing, wanting, and doing. This
pattern, I suggest, has created a new form of adherent autonomy, which offers the freedom to
choose as much as it surveils, expects, and moralizes “good” choices in the pursuit of good care.
Consequently, adherent autonomy deprives patients of practical sovereignty and continues to
objectify individuals in more indirect and ostensibly acceptable forms.
Chapter 3 delves into physicians’ definitions for culture, which range in scope and
content, much like the historical anthropological debate on the matter. I identify several
important patterns in responses, revealing a prominent framing of culture as one’s beliefs on
normalcy. This conception becomes salient in the clinical encounter through characteristics
presumably creating resistance to successful chronic disease management.
In Chapter 4, I expand this argument by discussing the way this pattern of thought
manifests in descriptors used to delineate patient “cultures.” I demonstrate how “culture” and
“cultures” become explanatory and exculpatory linguistic devices used to mask structural
violence.
Chapter 5 takes a deeper dive into the most frequently offered stand-in for culture: race. I
provide an overview of the ways in which biomedicine reifies race before exploring the
assumptions that may become tied to race in clinics given physicians’ conceptions of what
culture means. I conclude this chapter with an analysis of why culture-qua-race functions as an
especially effective necropolitical tool that legitimizes socially constructed categories and
inequities while normalizing the slow death of groups on this basis.
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Throughout these chapters, I analyze physicians’ thoughts on cultural competence and
place their definitions and explanations in the context of competence’s goals. I discuss the ways
in which competence exoticizes and pathologizes not only culture, but all the characteristics that
culture is conflated with. I explore the effects of competence on exculpating physicians and
medical institutions, allowing them to create the appearance of equitable care without the true
substance necessary to dismantle systemic roots of inequity. In this way, I consider the role of
performativity and pseudocare underlying competence and contributing to its dangerous effects
as diagnostic of the larger issues with the “happy” language of medical care.
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Constructing Care

2

“Noncompliance may be the most significant problem facing medical practice today. As one reviewer
notes, “In an era when efficacious therapies exist or are being developed at a rapid rate, it is truly
discouraging that one-half of patients for whom appropriate therapy is prescribed fail to receive full
benefit through inadequate adherence to treatment.” - Eraker, Kirscht, and Becker (1984)

The Controversy of Compliance
Before investigating physician responses, it is critical to become more familiar with the
reasons that compliance has become so heavily denounced in the medical arena. Primarily,
critics of the label have argued that compliance and non-compliance can become tools to
reinforce the hegemony of physicians by “assum[ing] and justif[ying] physician authority”
(Ferzacca 2000, 29). This position acknowledges that clinical encounters are frequently, if not
always, characterized by a knowledge and power imbalance in the favor of physicians. Patients
must consequently yield their power in several ways, one of which is the offering up of the self
for judgment. Here, one must reframe clinical encounters as more than conversations between
patients and physicians and instead recognize the breadth of influences that impact patientprovider interactions, as Ferzacca does in his article exploring the clinical management of
diabetes:
The clinical encounter is a punctuated moment of experience during which cultural ideals
and social values that have currency in our society at large become crystal clear, and are
thus held up as standards by which to measure idiosyncratic cultivations of the self and
the degree to which each case adheres to its obligations. These markers of the "ideal
man" are also signs of salvation from the throes of disease due to an unhealthy lifestyle.
(Ferzacca 2000, 35).

From this perspective, judgment of compliance can be considered as the diagnosis of the
patient rather than of the patient’s disease. Take, for example, a patient with Type 2 diabetes. A
18

physician’s assessment of the severity of this condition relies on quantitative indicators like A1c,
which is a measure of one’s recent average level of blood sugar (American Diabetes Association
2015, S8). In contrast, evaluation of the patient’s compliance to an anti-diabetic regimen depends
upon far more qualitative factors and draws on qualities of the patient rather than their body.
Whether or not the patient regularly checks their glucose levels, takes prescribed medications,
and eats at consistent times may all factor into this appraisal. Compliance, then, compares
patients’ behavior against that of an “ideal” patient whose characteristics are shaped in the
biomedical imagination not only by objective or, at least, numerical markers, but also by
moralized qualities concerning willpower, indulgence, and “unhealth.” In this chapter, I will
explore the ways in which physicians I interviewed deconstructed the challenges of dietary
management into knowing, wanting, and doing, each of which negotiated the boundaries between
care and choice yet spoke in coded terms about moralized deviance. I suggest that erasing
compliance from medical terminology has only enabled the creation of a new, indirect form of
adherent autonomy, which continues to assess patients’ behaviors and to expect the performance
of good care as self-surveilling physicians. Ultimately, I contend that it is difficult to escape the
biomedical gaze which sees patients as subjects to diagnose and control.
A 2017 article in The New York Times, titled “The Cost of Not Taking Your Medicine,”
declared that “[t]here is an out-of-control epidemic in the United States that costs more and
affects more people than any disease Americans currently worry about. It’s called nonadherence
to prescribed medications, and it is—potentially, at least—100 percent preventable by the very
individuals it afflicts” (Brody 2017). This assignment of intentionality to non-compliance,
“invites moral assessments” because this behavior is framed as “wasting resources and
encouraging avoidable disease, with associated higher societal and individual costs” (Hawking
19

2020, 2317). In this way, compliance shifts the burden of responsibility for both personal and
societal health onto individual patients. It becomes one’s moral duty to comply. Under this
neoliberal regime of “healthism,” any non-compliance then, is deviance that summons blame and
that can affect a patient’s perceived deservingness for care.
Compliance, alongside illnesses, becomes medicalized and brought within the hegemonic
jurisdiction of biomedicine; it becomes something to diagnose, something to treat. It is this
paradigm that critics point to when decrying the concept of compliance. Compliance
overestimates patients’ agency and exposes care recipients to unjust, excessively moralized
evaluation of behavior in clinical encounters where they are already in vulnerable states. It
follows that if one is interested in deconstructing paternalistic care and instead pursuing
partnerships between patients and providers, one must evaluate whether linguistic transitions to
“adherence” have also promoted the decentering of the practices that made compliance
controversial. To investigate this question, I decided to inquire physician interviewees about their
definitions and perceptions of compliance, discovering several patterns in perspectives on the
term that explained either its sustained application or its gradual erasure. To my surprise, only
one of the ten physicians with whom I conversed even came near to endorsing the continued use
of compliance in clinical care.

Overcoming Deviance
Appearing on screen, Dr. Ash waved warmly, dressed in scrubs each a different shade of
blue. The machinery surrounding her made it clear she had just wrapped up her morning surgery.
“I hope you don’t mind, I'm in the OR,” she said, reaching up to quickly adjust her cap. Assuring
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her that the location was fine, I expressed my gratitude for her time and her enthusiasm to speak
with me. After all, hers had been one of the fastest replies to my recruitment email and, in it, she
had remarked that she found my subject of research a “very interesting topic and certainly a
struggle.” She served as a bariatric surgeon, she explained as I began inquiring about her role,
and this meant she worked with patients who qualified for weight loss surgery by being
“morbidly obese,” a clinical category defined by a body mass index (BMI) greater than 40 or a
BMI greater than 35 coupled with chronic conditions like diabetes and hypertension. She
frequently spoke with patients about nutrition, she shared, “because they have to lose weight,”
not only because it made the bariatric operation easier, but also because many insurance
companies—her tone sharpening in a way suggesting she had shared this message frequently
before—would not approve the surgery if patients gained weight in the lead-up to the procedure.
As we discussed the longitudinal nature of Dr. Ash’s interaction with her patients, both
before surgery and after at checkpoints ranging from one week to one-and-a-half years postsurgery, she was approached by a colleague with a question. Pausing to answer, she picked up
her laptop and walked to a new location within the operating room as I asked whether she
discussed food at all the visits she mentioned. “Hands down,” she replied. Probing further to
clarify whether Dr. Ash discussed food with patients mainly in the context of weight loss, I grew
curious about her thoughts on the notion of compliance and asked her about it. “I think it's
twofold,” she explained after silently contemplating. “I think it's the patient understanding the
instructions that are given to them, and then following those instructions to the best of their
knowledge and ability.” Expanding on how her patients fared with compliance as she defined it,
Dr. Ash provided a nuanced assessment:
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From a surgical standpoint, knock on wood, they do well, okay. From patient compliance
and patient understanding, I think it's not as well as the surgical outcome [sic]. And I
think that it is…a lot of it is not necessarily education, I think, as the complexity of
understanding food, right? And what is good and what is bad is much more complex.
Especially for these patients who may not be educated, they just don't know. And so, I
think that's what makes it harder. Okay. And also, I think sometimes these patients do
have a component of addiction to food. And so, if I say, two weeks after your surgery, I
only want you to have a pureed diet, and you give them applesauce…can you know the
breakdown? They eat, you know, a fried fish sandwich. You know, I think it's just they
fall into those bad habits again, right? So, it's kind of complex in that regard.

Within her explanation, Dr. Ash created two critical distinctions revealing concepts
critiqued by opponents of compliance. First, Dr. Ash separated “surgical outcome[s]” and
“patient compliance,” underscoring the previously discussed idea that quantitative diagnoses of
disease are divorced from qualitative diagnoses of patients’ behavior. Further exploring this
point, by noting that surgical outcomes are often better than patient compliance and
understanding, her account suggested that a degree of non-compliance can be overcome. This
process of overcoming non-compliance is achieved by the biomedical apparatus—a collaboration
between medical knowledge and physician operators. Care recipients’ deviance, therefore, is to
be treated by the care provider, offering an example of the condemned medicalization of noncompliance. Framing non-compliance as something to diagnose and address objectifies patients,
critics suggest, inflating the perceived authority and power of the physician over the patient.
Dr. Ash also created separation between knowledge and knowledge creation. When she
mentioned patient understanding, she paired the notion with compliance, as if to suggest that the
two were codependent. In other words, one must understand the instructions and rules in order to
abide by them. Since the rules themselves come from biomedical knowledge, one may
reasonably suggest that the delivery of these instructions, then, is the responsibility of physician
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operators. However, Dr. Ash’s broad reference to “education” detached this role from care
providers and instead abstracted away the burden of knowledge creation. This form of selfexculpation is another decried aspect of compliance as it permits physicians to ignore important
external limitations and hold patients entirely responsible for their capacity to comply with
recommendations. While Dr. Ash’s explanation of compliance in bariatric surgery offers insight
into some of its critiques, I must also note that her use of the term may also be complicated by
the setting in which she practiced.
When Dr. Ash noted that insurance companies will deny funding of patients’ operations
if they gain weight prior to surgery, she offers insight into a potential reason for the sustained
employment of the term “compliance” in clinical care. Increasingly, the delivery of care has
become regulated by external, capitalistic, forces. As Kleinman and van der Geest argue, “[t]he
bureaucratic structures and financial constraints of care undermine the art of medicine and
interfere with the ancient task of caregiving” (Kleinman and van der Geest 2009, 163). One
example of this, I argue, is these external determiners of what procedures can be funded for
patients, like insurance companies, since they may encourage physicians like Dr. Ash to assess
non-compliance as patients cannot receive surgery if they do not achieve weight loss.1 In making
this point, I aim to reinforce the notion that my critiques of compliance do not seek to demonize
individual physicians, whose ability to gatekeep care may be overestimated considering growing
bureaucracy, but rather to dissect the structures within which they operate.

While a more detailed exploration of financial institutions’ role in defining and problematizing
“unruly” or “risky” patient behavior is beyond the scope of this paper, such analysis is necessary.
1
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Ambivalence and Adherence
After my conversation with Dr. Ash, I believed that I might see similar responses about
the use of compliance from my other physician interviewees. However, I quickly found that no
other physicians were as accepting of the concept. Most refused to directly answer my question
about their definition for the term and, in fact, many interviewers paused upon hearing my
question, some going so far as to visibly grimace. Since I gave no indication to my interlocutors
about my engagement with literature criticizing compliance so as not to add any pressure on
them to denounce the concept, several physicians used the opportunity to educate me on shifts
away from compliance. Dr. Donahue was one such individual.
I had met Dr. Donahue once before when she had helped create a smoking cessation
protocol now in use at a local free clinic. During that meeting, I had been introduced to her
genial and straightforward way of speaking, an equally warm and assertive tone that immediately
divulged her extensive experience in the field. It was this expertise that manifested in the variety
of roles Dr. Donahue played. Not only did she see her own panel of internal medicine patients at
her West County practice, but she also supervised care of patients in the residents’ clinic, playing
a guiding role in the training of new primary care physicians.
During our conversation, Dr. Donahue brought up the dissonance that she frequently
observed between residents’ suggestions to patients and patients’ following of these
recommendations. Feeling that this would be a natural transition point into a discussion about
compliance, I inquired about her thoughts on the term. Immediately, Dr. Donahue winced on
screen before letting me know that the preferred term was adherence. Compliance suggested
doctors were in charge, she remarked, before interrupting her own pattern of thought to muse
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aloud that despite this impetus behind the change in terminology, adherence too effectively
suggested the same paternalism.
From Dr. Donahue’s perspective, regardless of the language used, it was important to
remember that doctors were not perfect and often did not understand everything about their
patients. While there were certainly times when physicians were convinced that their suggestions
would be the best course of action, there were also times where multiple options were equally
viable. “We can use motivational interviewing techniques, we can encourage, we can be
supportive, but we can't make them do any of those,” she commented. Dr. Donahue’s sentiment
aligns with arguments advanced by critics of compliance that the term implies paternalistic care
and falsely inflates physicians’ authority and ostensible omniscience. Note, however, that she
was not convinced that “adherence” linguistically outmaneuvered these problematic connotations
either. Her offhand comment reveals an interesting perspective echoed by her colleagues who
also antagonized compliance yet approached the new terminology with a critical sense of
skepticism.
Dr. Engles, who also served as a primary care physician at a satellite practice in St.
Louis’s West County, expressed sentiments like Dr. Donahue’s. While discussing compliance,
she was vocal about the controversial label and promptly made clear that she did not use the term
because of its patient-blaming implications. She felt that the way medical education had
historically framed the term was problematic and that in primary care, the most important thing
was to remain open and non-judgmental whereas the term stripped patients of their agency. To
my surprise, Dr. Engles too shared without being prompted that while the preferred term was
adherence, she felt that this new word did not sufficiently improve upon compliance. More
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specifically, she shared, adherence did not indicate the necessarily shared nature of decisionmaking with patients.
I highlight Dr. Donahue’s and Dr. Engles’s accounts here because their doubts about
adherence are critical sentiments overshadowed by institutional projections of confidence behind
the linguistic shift. By this, I mean that while large biomedical institutions market adherence as
the optimal successor to compliance, uptake of this term has not come without consideration and
criticism by physicians. Most physicians I interviewed acknowledged compliance as an outdated
term and employed adherence instead while remaining unconvinced that the term sufficiently
overcomes patronizing implications. Therefore, it is worth interrogating the reasons that
physicians offered for their use of adherence. In other words, what goals, beyond an escape from
the implications of paternalistic care, could motivate and justify the shift in terminology? My
investigation into this question revealed an additional perspective from which compliance could
be critiqued, providing insight into my interlocutors’ conceptions of care.

Informative Care
While some of my interlocutors explained the transition to adherence as a consequence of
personal or institutional recognition of the power imbalance that compliance implied, Dr. Greer
did not rely on this rationale. “Oh, I talk about stuff liberally,” she said with a laugh after she let
me know she was perfectly fine having our interview recorded. Dr. Greer was an experienced
physician and, of all my interviewees, had spent the most time in the medical field. As a result,
her roles extended to a variety of leadership positions in her workplace’s endocrinology
department and in national endocrinology organizations. As we began discussing her clinical
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experience, I also discovered that of her patients, some had been with her for as long as 30 years.
Patient visits almost always involved a discussion, beginning with the initial appointment where
Dr. Greer conversed with patients about pre-visit questionnaires inquiring about food frequency,
diet history, and a 3-day food record.
When we began discussing Dr. Greer’s thoughts on compliance, she responded first that
she had never thought about the word’s meaning. To her, compliance looked like people
following recommendations as much as they could. “For medications, it's taking [them] every
day. For eating, no one is perfect, and it is, you know, probably following recommendations
about eating most of the time,” she added. While Dr. Greer had rarely used the term in her work,
she noted that “most people” now preferred the word adherence. She felt that the labels of
compliance and non-compliance, or adherence or non-adherence for that matter, did not provide
sufficient detail. So, she opted to use more descriptive language in her notes such as specific
references to the high saturated fat or high sugar nature of patients’ diets. This information, she
felt, had more relevance to actionable steps. I asked Dr. Greer at this point whether she knew
why the shift in appropriate terminology might be occurring, then. Commenting that she was not
entirely sure, she postulated that perhaps individuals believed that adherence might be a less
negative term, without expanding any further on this thought.
While Dr. Greer never explicitly expressed her doubt about adherence as the preferred
linguistic successor to compliance, she made her feelings known in other ways. For example, she
grouped the labels together when speaking about the problems of this terminology, as if no
distinction existed between the two. Furthermore, she distanced herself from adherence by
suggesting other “people” motivated this shift for reasons she could hypothesize about but of
which she could not be sure. Instead of decrying compliance’s condescending implications, then,
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she approached the matter from an informational standpoint and chose to focus on the more
immediate definition of the word. Importantly, her explanation that the labels offer little
information reveals her belief that the utility of language used in medical care should lie in
helping direct “actionable steps.”
As I performed my interviews, I found that Dr. Greer was not alone in holding this belief.
Dr. Cordero, for example, did not mention paternalism and instead justified her disinclination
towards compliance by explaining that the term described “patients following a particular
regimen, could be like a medication recommend or dietary regimen.” “So, I think it's a term that
doesn't really tell you much. I mean, do they follow it, or they don't follow it [sic]. But it doesn't
really tell you the why,” she added, nodding to the same non-informational binarization critiqued
by Dr. Greer. For these physicians, compliance and adherence offer dichotomous detail of
whether patients are performing provided instructions but do little to explain this behavior or
inform future directions. The arguments expressed by Dr. Greer and Dr. Cordero, like the
viewpoints shared by Dr. Donahue and Dr. Engles, critique compliance from the perspective of
ultimately improving clinical care. However, the two diverge in their approaches. Synthesizing
these perspectives offers insight into my physician interlocutors’ deconstruction of care into a
pair of components.

The Affective and Technical Labors of Care
When Dr. Donahue and Dr. Engles underscored compliance’s paternalistic connotations,
they suggested that erasing the term from medical language is motivated by a desire to provide
care that places the provider and recipient on more equal ground. Good care, they suggested,
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requires physicians to remain non-judgmental, supportive, and motivating. Dr. Greer and Dr.
Cordero instead employed a utility-focused standpoint to interrogate the information offered by
compliance. They suggested that eliminating the term compliance is important because it offers
no valuable or, more specifically, applicable insight for care. For these physicians, improving
care requires informed decision-making towards actionable steps, prescriptions, or procedures
for patients. These reasonings are different but not mutually exclusive. The dissonance between
these physicians’ reasonings for critiquing compliance do not construct entirely different
meanings for good care. Instead, I suggest that they point to distinct affective and technical
components that make up the moralized act of caretaking.
As theorists have framed and reframed care across time, the characteristics assigned to
this interaction have evolved. Early conceptions of care centered the perspective of impartiality,
which suggested that a uniform set of ideals could be applied to all moral scenarios. However,
scholars responding to this deontological position argued instead that care was a dynamic,
individualized, and severely partial act. The resultant body of thought, known as ethics of care,
holds, among other contentions, that care, as an interpersonal relationship, demands an attention
to individual subjectivities. These subjectivities detail the “complex ways in which people’s
inner states reflect lived experience within everyday worlds as well as within temporary spaces
and transitions” (Biehl, Good, and Kleinman 2007, 5). Care, in this way, becomes a bidirectional
process of making and understanding meaning.
The phenomenon of intersubjectivity, or “the ways in which we come into being through
the mutual recognition of another,” demands a dynamic and constant negotiation between the
“one-caring” and the “cared-for” (Burke 2014, 32). Consequently, scholars rebuke the notion
that care can be neutral and suggest instead that care is inherently an interpersonal process of
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meaning-making. From this standpoint, several features emerge to characterize care, best
outlined by gender and care theorist, Joan Tronto. In her chapter from Feminist Theory: A
Philosophical Anthology, Tronto argues that care is both an act and a way of acting. It is both an
affective “mental disposition of concern” and the technical or “actual practices that we engage in
as a result of these concerns” (Tronto 1998, 16). Most relevant to my own work with clinical
dietary management, she points out that a physician’s care is not only the “concrete practices of
prescribing medical treatment,” but also the “attentiveness and concern” that they must possess
(Tronto 1998, 16). This breakdown parallels my interlocutors’ comments. Dr. Greer and Dr.
Cordero include the visible portion of care in describing the utility of medical language as a
director for future steps. This technical component is partnered then with the affective work
highlighted by Dr. Donahue and Dr. Engles. Physicians must be motivating and pay particular
attention to the individual challenges faced by patients, they suggested.

Swapping Places
In this way, my exploration of physician perceptions of the terms compliance and
adherence begins to elucidate their construction of good care as a way of both feeling and
behaving. However, this analysis concerns only one dimension of care, focusing on the “onecaring.” This prompts a discussion of the other side of the interpersonal, intersubjective
experience of care. Thus far, I have explored what physicians believe good care looks like in
terms of the “one-caring,” or the care provider. Having unpacked my interviewees’ construction
of care as a duty for the physician with affective and technical components, I am left with
exploring what they believe then to be the duty of the patient. The examination that follows rests
on the assumption that if there is a proper way of caring, then there must also be a proper way of
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being cared-for. In fact, this paradigm has been surveyed by theorists in the past, giving rise to a
critical perspective centering two relevant logics: the logic of care and the logic of choice.
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To Know, To Want, To Do

3

“The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror.” - Hans George Gadamer

Transference
One of the primary challenges of intersubjectivity in the clinical encounter where a
frequent imbalance of power and knowledge dominates is the relative ease of conflating action
with choice. In attempting to diagnose patient behavior, “[i]t is often far from easy to
differentiate between what you do not want and what you cannot do” (Mol 2008, 52). In fact, one
of my interlocutors, Dr. Iver expressed this understanding. After sharing her thoughts on the
paternalistic nature of compliance, she explained that adherence was a more comfortable term for
her to use and went on to outline barriers to adherence she commonly saw in her work:
Part of the reason people struggle with adherence is that physicians and providers seem
unable to practice transference where you try to be in the other person's shoes. So, for
instance, my trainees have been taught to default to sending patients home on four
injections of insulin a day, and then wonder why they can do that. We are all educated
people, you know, good means. And if someone sent me home and told me to take four
injections of insulin, I would tell them to take a hike. So, I mean, I think the fact that we
can't even attempt to understand what the patients are going through, it's no wonder that
they're unable to follow these very complex instructions.

Dr. Iver noted that as a physician, she and her colleagues are “educated people,” alluding to the
concept of understanding “very complex instructions” referenced by several of my interlocutors
as being both a challenging and important part of chronic disease management. She also
suggested that the task of injecting oneself with insulin daily may not be a task even she would
be motivated to perform and that if one were to prescribe her this regimen, she might “tell them
to take a hike.” While Dr. Iver steps into patients’ shoes and offers potential explanations for the
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difficulties of adherence, she also reflects on the difficulty of doing just that, reinforcing the
common difference in experience, perspective, and life itself between physician and patient.
While probing my interviewees’ thoughts on the linguistic shift in terminology from
compliance to adherence and their perceptions of these terms offered insight into what they
believed proper caring looks like, a different set of questions elucidated their beliefs on proper
forms of being cared-for. Instead of asking physicians to answer from the one-caring’s shoes, I
asked what challenges their patients might face when asked to comply, to adhere, or, for those
who preferred using neither term, to manage chronic disease through diet. This question
prompted my interviewees to present the perspective of the cared-for as they understood it. Many
responded with anecdotes and examples they had collected through their counseling.
In this chapter, I discuss interviews revealing that physicians commonly deprioritized the
action or doing component of chronic disease management, instead focusing on the knowing and
wanting that they believed were necessary to achieve good care on the part of the patient. These
coded terms created a new evaluation of adherent autonomy, which ostensibly accommodated
choice yet still demanded moralized behavior aligned with the biomedical ideal as a selfsurveilling physician. This behavior was assumed in differential ways, with patients being
conceived of in groups or collectives whose characteristics could predict the probability of
deviance.

Understanding the Rules
Many of my interviewees echoed a common sentiment that what patients were being
asked to do to manage their chronic condition through diet was simply a very difficult procedure.
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I probed my interviewees further on this point, inquiring whether they might be able to share the
most common barriers they saw patients face when attempting to manage their condition. I
recognized that most explanations outlined a variety of components, beginning with an
understanding of what exactly management entailed.
Dr. Cordero was a familiar face. She was the advisor for the nutrition counseling program
run at the local free clinic where I volunteered. When not in endocrine service, Dr. Cordero was
involved with her public health interest of improving diabetes care for populations with low
access to healthcare. She commonly discussed food with her diabetic patients to understand what
they were eating before she provided specific recommendations. As I mentioned previously, our
discussion of her feelings towards compliance revealed that she did not use this term, nor its
successor, adherence, in her work due to the binary information she felt they provided. Instead,
she preferred to speak in general terms about chronic disease management and how her patients
fared. So, I inquired what factors commonly explained situations where patients had difficulty
with this task.
Many times, the answer lied in patients’ lack of understanding of the instructions, which
could be difficult, Dr. Cordero replied. “I mean, after the hospital, a lot of patients that don't
follow, for example, their insulin regimen, they just said they were really overwhelmed. And
then when they got home, they just couldn't remember how they were supposed to do it.” Later
in her answer, she returned to this idea of understanding, but this time discussed it in the context
of medications. Dr. Cordero shared that she found it shocking when patients were unaware that
they needed to get refills. Especially her Latinx patients, she commented, would instead attempt
to make appointments with her once they were completed with their first bottle of pills. Only
being able to schedule a visit for months later, this meant they frequently missed many critical
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doses. “I was like, yeah, so it says refills here,” she added, gesturing to an imaginary prescription
bottle.
At its base, Dr. Cordero’s explanation is a simple one. The greatest difficulty for
managing diet or disease is knowing what that management means and entails, she suggested.
However, this notion of understanding, and furthermore remembering, as a challenge is
complicated by the ways physicians speak about and assess it. Dr. Cordero’s comments, for
example, make it clear that while some understanding is deemed complex and struggling with
this knowledge is acceptable, other information should come easy. This concept is evident in Dr.
Cordero’s suggestion that while remembering insulin regimens might be acceptably challenging,
refilling prescriptions should not be a struggle. So, while framing understanding as a barrier, and
portraying chronic disease management as a vast body of knowledge, may serve as reasonable
attempts to identify with patients, the categorization and ranking of this information undermines
the endeavor to empathize.
Deepening my point is Dr. Ash’s previous explanation for the difficulties of patient
compliance with pre-surgery weight loss. “I think that it is…a lot of it is not necessarily
education, I think, as the complexity of understanding food, right? And what is good and what is
bad is much more complex. Especially for these patients who may not be educated, they just
don't know,” she stated. It is difficult to understand the instructions, Dr. Ash says, because
understanding food is inherently a complex task and struggling may be reasonable.
Simultaneously, however, Dr. Ash dances around the term “education,” first stating education
has little to do with the challenges of compliance yet very shortly after suggesting that education
plays a marked role in patients’ capacity to understand. At first, understanding is specifically tied
to nutritional information and the complexity of food. Quickly, however, understanding slips into
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a much broader, yet more formalized sense of the term. It becomes not just about a patient’s
ability to grasp the rules, but about their pre-existing body of knowledge gained through formal
systemic and institutional schooling. In this way, discussions of understanding give way to latent
implications, to socioeconomic indicators of education level, and to judgments of socio-moral
values.

Dealing in Collectives
The challenge of chronic disease management, my physician interlocutors suggested, is
grasping the rules. Deeper analysis, however, reveals that whether it be through Dr. Cordero’s
example of Latinx patients or Dr. Ash’s use of the term education, this problem is more about
knowing than understanding. My interviewees maintained that there is a level of “basic”
biomedical information or familiarity with technical actions that patients must know. Only above
a threshold of information complexity does difficulty with understanding or grasping this
material become acceptable. In this way, the deprioritizing of doing to highlight the challenge of
knowing, while intentioned to empathize with patients’ challenges, struggles to overcome
moralized judgment of the cared-for. In addition, these responses reveal that compliance,
adherence, and assessments of chronic disease management are unequally applied across
patients. My physician interlocutors appeared to think about patients in collectives, grouped by
attributes which made them more or less likely to behave at odds with the biomedical ideal.
The cases most illustrative of this notion were those where physicians directly
incorporated evaluations of patients’ inclination towards understanding the rules of chronic
disease management into their approach to care. Notably, Dr. Greer, an endocrinologist with a
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specific focus on lipid science, mentioned that she considered this factor when speaking with her
patients. It was important, she shared during our conversation, to understand what kinds of meals
patients ate frequently, much like Dr. Cordero had stated. With her South Asian patients, for
example, Dr. Greer commonly found herself discussing ghee, a clarified butter. So, she would
make sure to underscore its high saturated fat content and explore alternatives. While with most
other patients this type of discussion would entail a simple conversation, she pointed out that
with South Asian patients, she would commonly delve deeper and spend more time involving
scientific publications. She would regularly bring up papers from organizations like the Indian
Medical Heart Association because she found that many of her South Asian patients were “a lot
of professional people who are...very interested, and we can actually have a very thoughtful
discussion about what they’re eating at home.” Understanding, in Dr. Greer’s response, is tied to
the socially coded “professional people,” reinforcing the notion that knowing is not innocuous,
neutral, nor uniformly applied.
As I have demonstrated in these responses, my physician interviewees employed
collectives when speaking about and interpreting patient behavior. Recognizing the attributes
used to differentially predict behavior is critical to understanding care. Primarily, understanding
the terms used to define these groups, whether racial, ethnic, or “cultural,” and their ostensible
ties to deviance permits critique of these common practices. Importantly, these groupings
underscore the resulting shift of focus from individual patients onto imagined and assumed
categories to which they belong. This concept becomes even more obvious with another
component that my interlocutors mentioned as part of the challenges with chronic disease
management.

37

Desire, Decisions, and Donuts
To be capable of managing chronic disease, it was not enough for patients to understand
the rules; they also had to be invested in following these instructions. Dr. Greer’s response, for
example, hinted at another important factor that several of her colleagues also included within
their constructions of adherence: interest. She pointed to one example of patients who possessed
this investment in managing their condition:
I do have a fair number of patients who are very interested in prevention, because they
have a lot of familial disorders, cholesterol, and very bad family histories. And in many
of those people, they've already had heart problems or other vascular problems. There's a
big interest in doing everything they can. Now they will come in and say, “I didn't do
well,” or “I think I'm doing well,” or this, that or the other. So, I would say, probably half
of my patients actually are actively really trying to do something and another 25% are
sort of sometimes trying, and then...

Here, Dr. Greer painted a picture of an active patient, one who is “interested in prevention”
because of personal or familial history with chronic disease and enthusiastically appears at visits
assessing their own behavior and management. The way patients’ motivation is assessed is
thereby their self-presentation and willingness to judge their own behavior. In other words, Dr.
Greer suggested that interested patients are those who hold themselves accountable, effectively
equating motivation with self-appraisal against standards of management. Furthermore, there are
gradations to this motivation, Dr. Greer implies, in the form of those “sort of sometimes trying”
and the implied quarter of her patients who are uninterested in prevention. The notion of “trying”
begins to assign capacity to patients, suggesting that to do, they must want to do and that this
decision, then, is within their ability and choice.
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Physicians I interviewed frequently incorporated this idea of patients’ interest in
maintaining dietary regimens within their discussions and spoke frequently in terms of
motivation and decision-making. For example, Dr. Jin, another endocrinologist, noted that while
it was helpful when patients adhered to provided recommendations, the real goal, especially with
diabetic patients, was to help them get the tools to manage themselves. “So, if these patients are
adhering to what is best for their health, and it turns out to be not even requiring the medications
that we prescribed for them and they're taking care of their health, that, by all means, is
compliance. It is just taking initiative and the steps to manage their health properly,” she
explained. She noted that as medical records were now open to patients, physicians had grown
increasingly reluctant to label patients as non-compliant for fear of offending individuals. She
too had stopped using the term for this reason. Dr. Jin explained that while the difficulties of
adherence varied with each case, certain aspects remained constant:
That's where I really see my role as a counselor and advisor, instead of a paternalistic
kind of relationship, you know. I'm here to give them the tools to succeed, but it's
ultimately up to them. When the patient has finally decided that they want to take control
of their health, they make all the changes, I'm not there, you know, taking a donut out of
their hand at three in the morning. So, I would say it definitely takes time. Especially for
the patients that come with very poorly controlled diabetes, it takes or at least three visits
until their internal motivation sets.

Dr. Jin’s comments advance Dr. Greer’s statements on the interest of her patients, tying
motivation even more explicitly to the ability of managing chronic disease through diet.
Importantly, Dr. Jin reinforced the affective duties of care outlined by other physicians as being
guiding advisors rather than an imposing or paternalistic figure. Her additional comment that she
sought to provide patients the “tools to succeed” reinforces the goal of care as assisting patients
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with caring for themselves and assessing their own behavior to ensure it maintains these
standards.

The Necropolitics of Choice
At first glance, Dr. Jin’s and Dr. Greer’s sentiments return to the logic of care, which
puts forth the idea that care is not only an act but also a way of acting. More specifically, it is to
“act without seeking to control. To persist while letting go,” (Mol 2008, 28). This affective
performance is a way to offer space for patient autonomy. However, Dr. Jin’s response also
underscores the danger of reframing the logic of choice as the illusion of control. She shares, for
example, that success is “ultimately up to them,” speaking about patients who can seemingly
“[decide] that they want to take control of their health” and “make all the changes.” While the
underlying sentiments may be directed at respecting autonomy, these statements assume and
ascribe an inflated level of control to patients over their bodies and behavior.
Further compounding this issue is the moralization of choice. What one has control over,
one can be judged for. By this, I mean that while patients are allowed to make their own
decisions and believed to have control over these choices, some choices become “good,”
mapping positive attributes onto the patient’s moral character, and others are “bad.” Eating a
donut “at three in the morning,” for example, is Dr. Jin’s example of a bad choice. Particularly
when related to diet and eating, these bad choices become markers of “moral failure,” since they
are associated with laziness, greed, and indulgence in contrast to the soteriological virtues
deemed “necessary for capitalist success: hard work and self control” (Webb 2009, 856). The
clinical encounter thereby precipitates social ideals and, returning to Ferzacca’s portrayal from
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early in this chapter, measures “idiosyncratic cultivations of the self and the degree to which
each case adheres to its obligations” (Ferzacca 2000, 35).
The dangers of overestimating patients’ control over their choices lies in the
necropolitical function of these assumptions. When providers reduce successful chronic disease
management to a series of willful choices, they ignore the structural landscape which unequally
restricts the freedom of patients. Dr. Jin’s example of eating donuts, for example, may mask
more critical recognition of food insecurity, high costs of fresh foods, and disparate access to
these goods. Similarly, Dr. Cordero’s example of Latinx patients’ misconceptions regarding
prescriptions may conceal acknowledgments of barriers to health literacy. These examples
further make clear that it is particularly important to understand this argument in the context of
the collectives I have previously discussed. When physicians interpret patients using categories
with attributes believed to predict their behavior, they neglect consideration of structural
violence inflicted upon that group. Specifically, when care providers fragment patients into
collectives based on socioeconomic status, race, or similar categories, they may falsely assume
patients’ autonomy and characteristics direct health outcomes. The economic, political, and
social marginalization of these individuals, then, becomes dangerously disregarded.
As structural factors limiting patients’ capacity are ignored to frame decisions as a result
of their own choices, some collectives are effectively permitted to die as their death is not only
expected, but also attributed to their own behavior. This normalization of slow violence for some
groups over others based on assumed collectives is compounded, as I will show, by the
relocation of responsibility for care. As more of the onus is placed on patients to display a new
form of self-surveilling adherence, the necropolitics of choice becomes increasingly moralized.
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The Self-Surveilling Physician
In this way, the inclusion of motivation or interest in physicians’ explanations of the
challenges of managing chronic disease through diet reveals the way in which compliance and
adherence continue to be enforced in new terms even when erased from the visible language of
medicine. From my interviews, I argue that this paradigm is the result of physicians’ reframing
of patients as self-surveilling physicians, which regulates and moralizes patient behavior through
adherent autonomy at odds with patients’ practical sovereignty. The desire to construct nonpaternalistic care, it appears, gives way to near self-exculpation on the part of the care provider.
The burden of care is shifted from the “one-caring” to the “cared-for.”
Although compliance or adherence may be linguistically denounced and these terms
gradually expunged, the underlying assessment and moralization of patients’ behavior remains
not only incredibly relevant to clinical encounters, but also enforced in less visible ways.
Primarily, this dynamic is maintained by what I will call adherent autonomy. My interviews
revealed that physicians argue that their duty as care providers is to perform the affective and
technical labors of care, both of which could be improved, in their perspectives, by the erasure of
compliance from medical language to accommodate patients’ right to choose. However, I also
illustrate the ways in which these physicians maintained expectations of proper care-related
behavior for patients.
Specifically, physicians pointed out that the management of chronic disease involves the
challenges of knowing how to manage and wanting to manage, both of which were framed in
ways that ostensibly sought to deprioritize the act of managing itself yet ultimately remain tied to
sociomoral values. By this, I mean that physicians emphasized that the act of changing one’s diet
was difficult and attempted to elucidate this point by pointing to the complexity of understanding
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food and to the nature of remaining invested in management. While these explanations tried to
exculpate patients of blame for “non-compliance,” “non-adherence,” or any deviance in
appropriate disease management, they often revealed that physicians still harbored beliefs about
the correct or “good” choices patients should make and about reasonable struggles with
components of management. In this way, patients were offered autonomy within care, yet this
autonomy was qualified by the expectation of a new form of adherence, one where the patient
became responsible for delivering their own care and assessing their own behavior. I suggest that
physicians map moralized responsibilities onto their patients in their construction of patients as
“self-surveilling physicians,” who are not only transformed from the “cared-for” into the “onecaring,” but are also expected to perform the same affective and technical labors physicians’
suggested to constitute good care.
From my interviews, many explanations offered by physicians for the challenges of
dietary management pertained to patients' effective transformation into physicians themselves,
required to care for themselves through a strict routine of “self-surveillance” (Pollak 2017, 198).
Patients diagnosed with diabetes, for example, can frequently be expected to perform tasks such
as “testing blood sugar levels, counting and limiting the grams of carbohydrates in all consumed
foods and beverages, exercising, examining feet wounds, taking oral medications, and/or
administering insulin injections” (Pollak 2017, 198). Not only did Dr. Iver’s comments about
insulin regimens highlight this point, but Dr. Jin’s statements about self-regulation of food
consumption and Dr. Greer’s note about patients’ motivation to assess their own behavior further
compound this idea that patients are increasingly expected to manage themselves. Note that
much like physicians suggest good care consists of affective and technical components, the care
they expect patients to perform also is made of these pieces. It is important for patients not only
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to do the visible acts of eating healthy foods, but it is also important for the patient to remain
cognitively and affectively invested in this behavior. An active patient must become a selfsurveilling physician who possesses the know-how and attuned desire of caring through food.
While this shift in the responsibility of care is reasonably a return of autonomy to the patient who
can now make decisions pertaining to their health, I argue that this adherent form of autonomy,
while appearing to free the individual, demands simultaneously that it hold itself accountable and
captive.
On the topic of compliance, Dr. Hanson, an endocrinologist, noted immediately like
others that she disliked the term for its physician-centric nature and because there were so many
factors that affected a patient’s ability to do what was recommended of them. So, she did not use
the word in her work and had strayed away from even thinking about the notion of compliance or
adherence, she shared. It was more important, in her perspective, to work with patients to figure
out what would be reasonable and figure out how to navigate challenges in reaching their health
goals. I asked Dr. Hanson what kinds of challenges she normally encountered:
Having diabetes is hard. If you think about what we ask people to do, particularly if
they're having to check their blood sugar four times a day and give themselves insulin at
least four times a day, it's difficult to remember to take a medicine. I think, you know, in
some respects, time is a huge challenge. People are living lives, they have work,
sometimes there's childcare responsibilities, sometimes elder care responsibilities,
sometimes they may not have adequate transportation to get to their appointments, or to
get to the drugstore, or to get to the grocery store. So, I think those are a lot of the things
that come up frequently.

Notably, Dr. Hanson situates the condition of diabetes and the requests made of patients for
dietary condition at odds with all the other “responsibilities” that they are burdened with in daily
life. The task of caring for oneself adds to these responsibilities. Her sentiment is similar to that
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expressed by Berlant in their chapter, “Risky Bigness,” from the book Against Health: How
Health Became the New Morality. In this piece on obesity and the symbolic meaning of eating,
Berlant underscores the tiring effects overcoming the American body, driven mostly by
capitalistic interests and the necessary duties of living. “The contemporary human,” they
suggest,” is fatigued in the literal sense but also a metaphorical one, as in what metal ‘feels’
when it no longer can bear the stress placed on it” (Berlant 2010, 27). Berlant’s argument
surrounds what political theorists term sovereignty, which is not only one’s power, but one’s
sense of power, one’s “control over the conditions of life” (Berlant 2010, 29):
All of this juggling of actual social involvement and phantasmatic sovereignty takes place
in the context of everyday lives that are maximally stressed out. This is to say that the
work of getting through the day exhausts our practical sovereignty. We are compelled to
act responsibly. That is what it means to be competent, an adult. The obesity epidemic,
part of the expansion of the physical unhealth we see everywhere, is a symptom of our
struggle to survive the day, the week, the month, and the life, an as-if sovereignty that
depletes resources of compliance from us that we barely have. The stress we experience
in environments that are already absorbing the best part of our energy and creativity is so
enormous that we are forced to ask whether we can even imagine this world as a world
organized for health.

From this position, it becomes easier to understand why adherent autonomy can become a
problematic and demanding concept, especially if one subscribes to Berlant’s notion that under
the stress of daily life, one’s practical sovereignty is continually drained. “We are compelled to
act responsibly,” they write, alluding to the moral values of self-restraint, hard work, and
willpower extolled in physicians’ constructions of understanding and motivation. Even if
compliance and adherence are removed from medical lexicon, they therefore continue to be
enforced indirectly through the patient’s transformation into their own “one-caring” who must
exhibit a desire to be healthy as defined by biomedicine and must work towards this goal.
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Deviance from this behavior, then, is certainly within the patient’s freedom to choose yet violates
the logic of care as it is constructed by physicians. I would argue that a patient who is allowed to
choose yet is morally judged and graded for deservingness on the basis of this choice has not
truly been returned power and has only been offered the illusion. Practical sovereignty thereby
continues to be deprived through this adherent autonomy, which exists in the complicated
intersection between the logics of care and choice.

“Cultural” Collectives

Thus far, I have discussed compliance, dietary management, and adherent autonomy
while regarding patients largely as discrete, individual units. However, this model omits an
important reality: patients, like all individuals, belong to groups. Care, too, is often delivered
both linguistically and practically to collectives that are defined in various ways. This became
evident in my interviews as well. Physicians frequently referred to patients in groups when
describing them and, furthermore, used these collectives when describing patient behavior or the
challenges of chronic disease management. Take, for example, Dr. Cordero’s comments from
earlier in this chapter where she referred to Latinx patients while outlining misconceptions about
refilling medications. Later during our conversation, Dr. Cordero again returned to collectives
when explaining discordant beliefs:
I feel like in a clinic setting it's that relationship that you get to build with patients that
makes things easier. Like they trust you. And then it's just easier for them to understand
or follow whatever they need to do. Because I know or, so I became aware a lot of these
groups just don't have great past experiences with the medical system, or there's a lot of
mistrust. Or just culture and belief that they, yeah, they believe something else will help
them more than what you tell them...So in that way, I feel like in the clinic, once you
develop a trusting relationship, patients will be more accepting. Sometimes it's hard to
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overcome that barrier, those barriers, so sometimes we have immigrant patients in the
hospital, and for example, for diabetes, they just straight refuse to change their diet. Why
would I even listen to you? I mean, there is definitely a very short period of time to build
trust.
The importance of Dr. Cordero’s reference to “culture” in her statement is the use of this
diagnostic category to explain patients’ responses and behavior. The seeming choices that
patients make can become attributed to the collectives to which they belong. Assumptions about
these groups, then, can influence the delivery of care as physicians attempt to perform the
affective and technical work that I have discussed in this chapter. For this reason, it becomes
important to investigate how physicians understand and apply the notion of culture in the dietary
management of chronic disease. Elucidating the way physicians work with culture in these
clinical encounters allows insight into how physicians make space for autonomy and choice
when they explain these decisions as originating from beyond the individual.

Diagnosing Collectives
Increasingly, theorists have recognized that culture has become one of the most prevalent
vehicles used to discuss discrepant behavior, particularly in the clinical setting. For example, in
Reproducing Race, Bridges discusses the frequent reference to patients’ “culture” to explain
actions seen as risky, deviant, inappropriate, and, most frequently, non-compliant. Not only does
this practice problematize groups of patients, but it also allows for exoticization as well as the
inaccurate and essentialist creation of imagined populations with specific and static values,
ideals, behaviors, and traditions. Returning to my argument that moral assessments of patient
behavior are not uniformly assessed or predicted, these critiques suggest that “culture” is a
primary tool used to fragment patients into discrete populations. As I have previously discussed,
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some patients, assigned real or imagined “culture” are conceived to be more likely to not know,
want, or do. Assumptions about culture depersonalize the patient, casting them as a stereotyped
member of a collective rather than as a human “self” who makes emotional and moral meaning
(Kleinman and Benson 2006, 1674-76). “Once apprehended as a ‘population,’ it is the population
that is acted upon,” writes Bridges (Bridges 2008, 146). Those who make up the entity become
nothing more than the stuff through which the population can be touched, manipulated, and
affected. The particular is dissolved in order to produce the universal” (Bridges 2008, 146).
These universals spur my discussion with interviewees about their conceptions of culture in the
delivery of care.
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r
The
Resistance of Normal

4

“There is perhaps a tendency to romanticize resistance, to read all forms of resistance as signs of the
ineffectiveness of systems of power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal
to be dominated. By reading resistance in this way, we collapse distinctions between forms of resistance
and foreclose certain questions about the workings of power” (Abu-Lughod 1990, 42).

A Difficult Task
“Could you define what culture means to you?” I asked.
“Oh my God. Okay. Um, I feel like I should have studied up for this,” Dr. Bell
commented as she chuckled. Apologizing for being flustered, she took a moment to collect her
thoughts. Then, she gingerly shared, “So maybe culture would be part of a patient's own personal
history, whether it is their religious background, family background, social background, part of
this patient's history that maybe contributes to how they kind of go through life and how they
perceive different parts of their life?” “That's a hard question,” she remarked with a grin to cap
off her answer. Frequently throughout my conversations, this question yielded a similar
response. Whether they approached the question with a “That’s a great question!...Gosh,” like
Dr. Engle or, like Dr. Cordero, immediately established their uncertainty in their answer with an
“I don't know if it's the right definition but...,” each physician nodded without fail to the
sentiment that the task of defining culture is a difficult one. In this chapter, I will explore how the
ambiguity of culture allows it to be applied as an imprecise explanatory factor for patient
behavior at odds with the biomedical “normal.” I argue that “cultures” become synonymous
with “others,” taking on any properties that might affect the performance of care and evading
acknowledgments of structural inequities.
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The concept of culture is admittedly a challenging notion to pin down and is one that
anthropologists have debated endlessly. One of the early definitions for culture was offered by
British anthropologist, Edward B. Tylor, who, in his book Primitive Culture, outlined the term as
“that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Goldstein 1957, 1076). While
Tylor’s framing inspired other formative meanings proposed by his contemporaries, no definition
has been offered without debate. In his exploration of these efforts, Goldstein argues that while
definitions of culture are valuable for “the didactic ends of a textbook,” they are of less practical
utility to anthropological theory. For example, if “a definition is so formulated that a literal
interpretation of it excludes certain cultural phenomena with which anthropology has been
concerned, it is hardly reasonable to expect that the interest in such phenomena will thereby
disappear. Much criticism of proposed definitions turns on precisely this point” (Goldstein 1957,
1076). In this way, efforts to narrow the scope of culture are met with resistance. It is perhaps
also for this reason that Goldstein notes anthropologists frequently apply and speak about culture
in their work in very different ways from the definitions they may have offered at the work’s
outset. As American sociologist Albert Blumenthal put it, “Different writers deliberately use the
term to indicate radically different realities and even when they seem to intend to indicate the
same realities they often vary equally as much” (Blumenthal 1936, 875).
As anthropologists continually venture into fields and subfields, the number of ways to
see culture only continue to expand into linguistic, cognitive, material, and other perspectives.
While one can therefore fill pages dissecting the multiple conceptions of culture that have been
formulated over the decades, I contend there is no value in this exercise beyond understanding
the sheer breadth of views on culture. It is more important to acknowledge that this range of
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definitions hints at the pervasiveness of culture in dialogue, the same ubiquity and vagueness that
undermine the precision with which the term is used in daily life. “Culture is a much used and
abused term,” wrote Blumenthal, underscoring the way in which culture’s constantly expanding
set of framings allow its relative ambiguity to become exploited and for the term to become an
explanatory excuse.

Thinking About Normal
To understand how physicians use culture to explain patient behavior and difficulties
managing chronic disease, I first sought to elucidate how physicians defined culture. While the
physicians I interviewed offered a range of definitions, several notable patterns emerged. Firstly,
my interviewees framed culture as being tied to patients’ personal histories, noting that culture
was something one inherited. This pattern was manifest in their references to “backgrounds” or
direct descriptions of culture as something “passed from generation to generation,” as Dr.
Cordero put it. Uniformly, my interlocutors also remarked that culture was determined from birth
and surrounded individuals as they were raised. Culture was framed as being ubiquitous, a notion
aligning with anthropological theory seeing culture as a learned, shared, and integrated concept.
It was unclear how this omnipresence was achieved, however, and no physician I spoke with
made explicit reference to any path of transmitting culture either. Instead, my interviewees
situated culture in a space between something genetic, or automatically encoded, and something
that had to be taught and learned.
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Overwhelmingly, my interlocutors defined culture as thought. Culture was as a set of
beliefs, a way of thinking, a lens through which individuals saw the world. However, the overlap
between my interviewees’ remarks did not end here.
Dr. Engles had reached out expressing interest in speaking with me after Dr. Donahue
had forwarded my recruitment email to all the physicians at her practice. Much like Dr.
Donahue, Dr. Engles was involved both in primary care for patients and education for internal
medicine residents. Many of her patients were those she worked with for many years. Some had
found her by chance since she was accepting new patients at a time when primary care
physicians were sparse in the St. Louis region. Others were those who had intentionally sought
and stuck with her as she was a provider with whom they felt a good fit. Dr. Engles commonly
discussed nutrition with her patients who had chronic conditions like diabetes and hypertension.
While she sought to emphasize the importance of diet to disease prevention with all patients,
time constraints prevented these discussions from being as detailed as she would have preferred.
After discussing Dr. Engles’s perceptions of “compliance” as a paternalistic relic, our
conversation turned to her thoughts on culture.
Remarking first that my question about her definition of culture was great, Dr. Engles
took a moment to think before commenting that the notion was one that was very entrenched.
“To me, let's see, culture means norms. I suppose societal norms that someone grows up with,
and is accustomed to, and really relates to pretty much every area of life: food, social
interactions, what is acceptable behavior, what is acceptable communication,” she explained. Dr.
Engles’s comment that culture concerns “acceptable” standards refines framings of culture as a
body of thought. Culture was not simply a way of thinking or a general set of ideas an individual
possessed, but rather the specific body of beliefs that directed an individual’s sense of “normal.”
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This portrayal of culture overlapped with those offered by many of her colleagues. When I asked
Dr. Donahue for her definition of culture, for example, she explained that the term referred to
“the composite of many aspects of language and dress and manners and etiquette and worldview
and how people interrelate with each other.” At the end of her response, she noted that she had
never actually considered how to define the term, a sentiment echoed by nearly all my
interviewees. Speaking specifically about diets, Dr. Donahue underscored the value and comfort
that foods offered to individuals. She explained her beliefs about the significant impact of culture
on patients’ engagements with diet through the symbolic nature of food and of eating:
The very first thing you do when a baby is born, is you obviously keep them warm, and
you offer them food that, you know, put the baby to the breast and wrap them up. Nice
and warm. It's, it's instinctive to it's such a nurturing thing. So, throughout life, food and
care and love are deeply intertwined. You know, everyone makes jokes about their
grandma trying to feed them too much, and all that, but yeah, but it's true there, there is a
deep intensity to being cared for by food. And we all grew up with certain foods that
seem that reminds us of home or wonderful times. And it's a very deep-seated resonance
with those things. And then, obviously, our tastes change over our lifetime. But there's
always still some core, I think, of that familiarity of mom's home cooking, grandma's
cooking, whatever, that stays with people. And even what is regarded as food in many
cultures in the world, eating insects is considered normal. And actually nutritionally,
they're excellent, they're high protein, they're low fat, it's actually excellent food source
but if you gave an American a bug and said eat it, they might upchuck on you. Right, you
know, a lizard on a stick roasted over an open fire, it's a delicacy in places and to an
American, they'd be kind of yucky. So, even what we regard as being acceptable food or
not, you know. Lutefisk. If you didn't grow up in a country eating lutefisk, you're
probably not going to get in the room when it's opened.

Dr. Donahue’s grounding of culture within the notion of acceptable, familiar, and
comfortable meals reveals insight into how culture is constructed, interpreted, and assumed.
First, Dr. Donahue connected culture with food, care, and love, commenting that these ideas are
“deeply intertwined” and are imbued with a “deep intensity.” These points go one step beyond
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linking culture with normalcy. They suggest that normalcy, especially with food, is created out
of affective investments and that these notions of what we find “acceptable” are so incredibly
resonant because they are interwoven with intimate, emotional comfort. Dr. Donahue’s argument
is paralleled by that of Lauren Berlant in their article “Risky Bigness.” Berlant discusses eating
as self-medication, one which must be seen as “an understandable response to feeling
overwhelmed, raw, a misfit” (Berlant 2010, 33). This form of care, they further argue, “is also
often part of being in a community organized through promises of comfort in a generalized
environment of belonging that might be personal (if one is a ‘regular’ somewhere) or anonymous
(if one is merely somewhere)” (Berlant 2010, 33). In other words, eating the foods one selects
creates a sense of identity and affiliation that resists the depersonalization imposed by the needs
of living or, more specifically, laboring. These familiar foods of comfort may return one to the
memories of “mom’s home cooking, grandma’s cooking,” or other similar intimacies of care
central to one’s creation, performance, and maintenance of self. Dr. Donahue’s framing of
culture thereby acknowledges and clarifies the affective position of culture in individual
subjectivities.
Simultaneous to her explanation of why culturally driven notions of normalcy are so
dominant and meaningful to someone identifying with that culture, Dr. Donahue pointed to the
difficulty of understanding visible expressions of cultural norms as an outsider. Her examples of
insects and lutefisk, for example, suggest that just as much as one can find comfort in certain
foods, others can find discomfort. This is just one example of the visible dissonance between
cultural perspectives and norms. These points are critical to my discussion of the challenges of
reconciling discrepant perspectives and experiences. They underscore not only the process of
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making meaning, but also the affective and personal investments in these intimate processes that
make them so valuable to the self and so difficult to understand for the outsider.
In addition, Dr. Donahue’s response reveals the way in which “culture” is constantly
interpreted against a reference. This notion is furthered by an exploration of my interlocutors’
creation of “cultures,” or “cultural” collectives.

Culture Versus Cultures
Exploring physicians’ definitions for culture as I have done so far is important to
understanding how my interviewees’ thought about this concept. However, it offers little insight
into their daily engagement with and explanatory operationalization of the idea. To probe the
way patients are organized into collectives during the delivery of care, I must begin discussing
cultures, which serves a very different linguistic purpose from culture. The latter, as an abstract
notion, points to the fabric of collectives, the “something” that binds individuals together to
make a group. It is this intangible, then, that I have presented interviewees’ definitions for,
asking physicians how they perceive this impalpable, cohering substance. Pluralizing culture
transforms the term entirely, grounding it in specific groups, practices, and visible performances
of cultural substrate. While “culture” permits the generalization that comes with a notion
possessed by all, as pointed out by my interviewees, “cultures” demands distinct categorization.
Exploring these parcellations, I argue, provides critical insight into how physicians construct
populations when providing care. So, within my interviews, I asked my interlocutors for
examples of cultures that they worked with in their practice.
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When I asked physicians about examples of cultures – so “groups” – they interacted with
frequently, I immediately observed that they were much more willing to answer my question
without pausing. In contrast to the time they spent thinking about their framings of culture, they
commonly listed off multiple examples of cultures without hesitation. While my interviewees’
readiness to identify groups speaks to the ubiquity of the term “cultures,” the comparison to the
hesitation involved with breaking down culture’s meaning was the first hint that it may be this
automaticity that undermines the precision with which the term is used. My conversations
repeatedly revealed that as physicians pointed to “cultures” among their patients, the biomedical
perspective inspired a focus on factors that might impede the delivery of care. Specifically, these
factors surrounded the perceived challenges of adherent autonomy. The trends I observed
revealed how my interlocutors framed “cultures” based on a reference centering the biomedical
and white hegemony, isolating factors that were different from these notions.

Otherness
Culture was a word that Dr. Greer used but whose definition she did not think about, she
shared. To her, the word referred to the aggregate of peoples’ family and other backgrounds that
influenced their actions. Inquiring about cultures she interacted with regularly, I learned that Dr.
Greer had what she believed to be a diverse patient population:
You know, I have the typical West County affluent people or city affluent people. I have
people who are religious, particularly Jewish kosher. I have a fair number of South Asian
patients. I have some Hispanic patients from different Hispanic locations, or different
Latin locations. We see a fair number of African American patients. I have, you know,
sort of rural culture patients like rural white culture or Black culture. Urban, suburban,
right? And then we have a number of people where we have interpreters, at least in the
fellows’ clinic. So, we have, I don't know how many languages represented, but I mean,
we have people speaking Arabic, various subcontinent dialects, Nepalese, some African
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dialects, Russian, Spanish, Vietnamese, Bosnian—there's a big Bosnian population in St.
Louis. We have a very broad immigrant community, actually, in St. Louis city. So, every
once in a while, there's something that we haven't quite figured out or it's difficult. You
know, Somali, what else have we seen lately? I don't know. So, yes, that becomes an
issue.
Should I interject with other stuff? The Illinois medical license and [the university’s] selfinsurance malpractice program required some online training and ethics or something
related. So, the one that I picked was an hour-long program on cultural sensitivity. I
actually did that one and learned a number of things about folk ideas, diet ideas, and
issues with interpreters and other things. Also, I'm involved in the National Lipid
Association, and we have some of our dietitians and our other members give lectures on
different dietary traditions at different places, say South Asia, Latin America, and some
other areas. We actually have tear sheets on how to do a heart-healthy diet and some have
actually been translated into Spanish. And I think the second language we went to for our
translation of some of these was Hindi.

In some ways, Dr. Greer’s detailed response is one that reorganizes and summates the
answers provided by her colleagues. Her answer pulls on an assortment of defining features to
group her patients into perceived cultural categories, making it an exemplary opening example.
Most notably, her answer rather imprecisely borrows various demographic, geographic,
socioeconomic, and racial terms as she frames different collectives with which she engages. This
amalgamation of characteristics used to name examples of cultures was common amongst my
interviewees, many of whom similarly invoked attributes that qualified as various forms of
“other.” By this, I mean that my physician interlocutors most frequently defined cultures based
on qualities that were not white, not American, and, in cases where gender was used as a
category to delineate cultures, not male. Some patients belonged to cultures that were named and
others, embodying dominant and hegemonic positions, were absent from responses, as if to
suggest that for these individuals, culture was not as deterministic or critical to identify. This
fascinating and important pattern mirrors Bridges’s work as well, in which she found that the

57

cultures of some patients were emphasized by physicians while other patients were “either
culture-free” or spoken about in a way that suggested that “their culture does not overdetermine
their eating habits and diets” (Bridges 2008, 146). This phenomenon reveals that the notion of
culture, which was regarded as universal by all my interlocutors, is not uniformly salient nor
equally applied when pointing to cultures. In this way, “cultures,” becomes equivalent to
“others,” defining groups that are different from the biomedical, Western, and white baseline.

Linguistic Curtains and Walls
While Dr. Greer mentioned Arabic, Nepalese, and Russian language in her classification
of “cultures,” she conflated these linguistic groupings with other terms. For example, she
mentioned that she saw “Hispanic patients from Hispanic locations,” applying a descriptor for
Spanish-speaking populations to describe geographic origins. Similarly, she pointed to “various
subcontinental dialects” and “some African dialects,” both of which name expansive areas yet
use a term referring to specific, concentrated, regional versions of language tied to those of a
particular class or social group (Haugen 1996, 922-933). This discrepancy not only points to the
linguistic compression of individuals into restrictively small groupings, but also suggests that
language is not as unremarkable of a categorization tool as one might imagine. Instead,
references to language can encode sentiments about social, economic, and political identities.
Dr. Donahue too referenced language in her answer:
The first, I don't know, decade or so of my career, I was a director of the resident clinic at
[my former workplace] and we had a large Russian immigrant population. These are
Jewish refugees from a former Soviet Union. At one point, I think 30% of our patients
were Russian speaking. So, we got to know that culture well. I'm sure not well, compared
to people who live there, but, you know, knew a fair amount about them [sic]. A lot of
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our interpreters had been healthcare professionals in the former Soviet Union. And so, it
was interesting to hear them talking about medical care and culture and life in the Soviet
Union and picked up stuff from them.

To cap off her response, Dr. Donahue added, “Ya govoryoo po-roosski ochyen' malo i
ochyen' ploho,” a phrase she had learned during her time working with Russian immigrants. I
discovered later that the sentence translates to an acknowledgement of speaking very little
Russian and having a poor grasp of the language. The frequency with which physicians invoked
language when providing examples forces a reflection on why language may be an easily
referable topic when creating patient clusters. The first explanation hinges on the intimate
relationship between language and culture, one that has been acknowledged by anthropologists,
sociologists, and linguists for years.
A textbook on the principles of teaching language, for example, writes that a “language is
a part of a culture, and a culture is a part of a language: the two are intricately interwoven so that
one cannot separate the two without losing the significance of either language or culture” (Brown
1994, 171). The field of linguistic anthropology, too, is based on this sentiment, the
“fundamental conviction that language, conversation, and discourse have their own distinct
properties and that the human significance of these semiotic properties is at least partially
inaccessible to studies of society and culture that do not take language into account” (Black
2013, 273). Language is crucial to daily life and to the communication and transmission of
culture; it is dynamic, symbolic, and constantly being created and recreated. The idea that
language and culture are intertwined is commonly taught and discussed, allowing one to more
easily make assumptions about individuals based on their language. So, it comes with little
surprise that my interlocutors referenced languages when providing examples of cultures.
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However, I must also note that there may be reasons for these linguistic categorizations that are
more specifically related to the clinical setting.
Another explanation, more particular to my interviewees’ daily interactions, may be that
language is particularly relevant in clinical encounters, which rely on effective communication
between the patient and physician. Firstly, in cases where the patient does not speak a language
spoken by the physician, an interpreter becomes necessary as Dr. Greer mentions in her
response. In these situations, the presence of an additional individual in the clinical space
becomes a tangible, physical marker of language’s importance. However, even in other cases,
language is constantly intertwined with the delivery of care. “[E]mbodied communication,”
writes Black, is central to care, which is “instantiated in interpersonal encounters through the
social organization of diverse semiotic resources such as gesture, facial expression, body
orientation, prosody, phonology, morpho-syntax, the materiality of media artifacts, and the built
environment” (Black 2018, 79). The performance of good care—that is, the visible technical and
affective components of doing—demand the efficient communication of information and an
empathetic way of speaking. For the purposes of my work, the fundamental point I make is that
language, and communication rituals broadly, are critical to the clinical encounter as well as to
the ethics and aesthetics of caretaking. This notion may explain the reliance on linguistic
categories in physicians’ examples of cultures.

The Place One Comes From
Several physicians who used language to categorize patients into groups or “cultures”
imprecisely employed geographic terms. Dr. Greer and Dr. Donahue, like many physicians,
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referenced their patients’ nationalities when describing the makeup of the population they cared
for. Dr. Jin, who defined culture as the backgrounds within which patients were raised,
responded similarly. Speaking about “cultures,” she noted that the majority of her patients
“[were] American and spoke English.” Others, however, she pointed out, were Spanish-speaking.
Dr. Jin’s answer tied being American to speaking English, equating a nationality with a linguistic
category. While one might argue that a patient could speak Spanish and be American, her
response does not offer this possibility. Instead, she placed the qualities of being American and
English-speaking in contrast to being Spanish-speaking. This practice reinforces the idea that
employing languages in grouping “cultures” may not only refer to the vocabulary one uses, but
also to one’s origins, social group, and citizenship. Dr. Bell was another example who advanced
the use of nationality to define perceived cultural collectives. Her response offers insight into the
ways cultures are discussed against a baseline, creating coded equivalency with the “other.”
“Hi, Dr. Bell, how are you?” I asked, to which I was greeted by a mild buzzing. As she
apologized for her neighbors’ decision to mow their lawn during our conversation, Dr. Bell
chuckled and looked out the bright window she was seated next to. After dispelling her concern
that the background noise would be disruptive, I gave her the rundown on my project before
asking about her work. Speaking about her endocrinology practice, Dr. Bell shared that her time
was split between inpatient and outpatient clinics and, procedurally, between hormone affirming
therapies for transgender patients2 and management for patients with chronic diseases like type 2
diabetes and obesity. She had good continuity with most of these patients, she stated, seeing
many of the individuals every three months unless their condition was well-controlled. With her

2

Frequently throughout my work, many physicians discussed care for transgender patients. This pattern can be
attributed to my sample’s high number of endocrinologists, who are commonly responsible for providing hormone
therapy.
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diabetic patients, she held conversations about food at every visit because of the condition’s
relationship with diet.
Later in our conversation, I asked for Dr. Bell’s thoughts about culture, to which she
responded before remarking that the question was a very difficult one to answer. Agreeing with
her that the question was challenging and broad, I inquired about examples of “cultures” she
interacted with in her work as she concurred this exercise might help her distill her thoughts. Her
patient population consisted of many Bosnian patients, she shared similarly to Dr. Greer.
Repeatedly throughout our interview, she brought up this “cultural” grouping of Bosnian patients
when discussing the relevance of culture. “You know, I feel like I keep going back to that
[Bosnian] population, because that's what's coming to my mind right now,” she shared. “I feel
like those patients are very good at bringing up, ‘this is our culture.’ They will say, ‘This is our
culture, this is what we eat.’ So maybe that it’s just because they brought it to my attention.” She
expanded on her statements by explaining that with Bosnian patients, she frequently experienced
struggles with dietary changes since certain aspects of food held “cultural significance.” In
particular, she noted that many family events and traditions cherished by Bosnian patients
involved carbohydrate-rich, heavy foods and so, dietary management often looked like
negotiating smaller portion sizes rather than cutting out these meals.
By speaking about Bosnian patients in the context of resistance to dietary changes, Dr.
Bell’s explanation returns to the earlier discussion of “culture” as an individual’s conceptions of
normal, familiar, and comfortable and their performance of these convictions. With all the
responses I have discussed thus far, but most obviously with Dr. Bell’s answer, the pertinence of
“culture,” in whatever terms it is framed, begins to become defined by the perceived
“abnormality” of those individuals’ beliefs when appraised against a “normal” of biomedical
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care. By this, I mean that the culture of Bosnian patients, for example, is assigned significance in
the clinical encounter primarily because their traditions and diets may occasionally be at odds
with prescribed nutritional advice. Similarly, the “cultures” of patients who speak Russian or
Spanish or Vietnamese are important because they influence the information that can be
conveyed and the way it can be conveyed. So, I argue that my physician interlocutors centered
their conceptions of “cultures” on differences from the ideal as defined from a biomedical
standpoint. However, I do not have to only isolate physicians’ reliance on language or nationality
to group patients in order to illustrate this paradigm. An exploration of other cultures physicians
pointed to while explaining the challenges of dietary management reveal not only how cultures
were constructed when thinking about resistance to, or difficulties with, knowing, wanting, or
doing, but also how these ostensibly explanatory collectives masked discussions of critical
structural factors.
“Cultures” of Mistrust
Some physicians, when asked for examples of cultures, chose to focus on local
“subcultures.” Dr. Donahue, in particular, supplemented her response by referring to patients in
the St. Louis region. “Well, even amongst local Americans just in this area,” she suggested,
“there are different cultures. If you compare North St. Louis to West County to Jefferson County,
there are very different cultures amongst those groups. Just look at uptake of COVID vaccines
and different cultures around our state, right? So many, many things there, if you're talking more
far-flung culture issue.” In her description, we see again that “culture” can be defined in the
context of discrepant beliefs, this time pertaining to vaccine hesitancy rather than to dietary
regimens. Later in our conversation, Dr. Donahue again returned to this idea, saying, “We
certainly encounter patients who have different cultural views, like whether they will take a
63

COVID vaccine or not. And distrust of physicians and our medicines and many other more
cultural than strictly medical, scientific kind of issues.” In suggesting that this distrust itself is a
cultural notion, Dr. Donahue reinforces the perspective that frames culture in terms of thought as
it pertains to shaping behavior. In other words, distrust here becomes the cultural thought that
drives the behavior of resistance. Dr. Donahue was not alone in putting forth this conception.
In the hospital, Dr. Cordero's patient population was “mostly white or AfricanAmerican,” she shared when I asked about cultures that she interacted with most frequently in
her work. In the clinic, there were more Latinx patients, she shared, and, occasionally,
immigrants from various African nations. In addition, Dr. Cordero noted that she was currently
working with a Vietnamese patient. While explaining the makeup of her patient population, she
explained that her interactions were often different between the hospital, where she provided
short-term care, and the clinic, where she delivered longitudinal care:
I feel like in a clinic setting it's that relationship that you get to build with patients that
makes things easier. Like they trust you. And then it's just easier for them to understand
or follow whatever they need to do. Because I know or, so I became aware a lot of these
groups just don't have great past experiences with the medical system, or there's a lot of
mistrust. Or just culture and belief that they, yeah, they believe something else will help
them more than what you tell them...So in that way, I feel like in the clinic, once you
develop a trusting relationship, patients will be more accepting. Sometimes it's hard to
overcome that barrier, those barriers, so sometimes we have immigrant patients in the
hospital, and for example, for diabetes, they just straight refuse to change their diet. Why
would I even listen to you? I mean, there is definitely a very short period of time to build
trust. And sometimes you can't overcome the culture.

Dr. Cordero’s account, even more than Dr. Donahue’s, demonstrates the ties physicians
can produce between “culture” and trust. By suggesting that culture is something to “overcome”
in the delivery of high-quality care, Dr. Cordero pointed to the ways that beliefs can pose
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challenges when they are incongruent with biomedicine, which itself as a body of thoughts on
“ideal” care is a culture of its own. However, I argue that these conceptions evade important
acknowledgments of pervasive structural determinants of distrust, resistance, and hesitancy.
A common example of distrust in medical providers begins with the infamous Tuskegee
Experiments. Since the nature of this severely unethical study was revealed, along with others
involving forced sterilization of Native American and Puerto Rican women, for example, public
discourse has largely entertained the notion that these trials inspire distrust of providers (Jaiswal
and Halkitis 2019, 80). Furthermore, and more importantly, poor healthcare outcomes too are
attributed to this “cultural” distrust. Note firstly that this conception assigns racial and ethnic
minorities “cultural” beliefs, conflating several different constructed categories. Secondly, this
framing acknowledges historical trauma yet makes no consideration of the ongoing
discrimination, racism, and prejudice that might more proximally inspire distrust of physicians
and other medical providers. For example, “[s]ocial inequality drives mistrust” (Jaiswal and
Halkitis 2019, 80). History may influence mistrust, but the present sustains it. My point here is
that in constructing “cultures” of mistrust, physicians miss an opportunity to recognize and
address ongoing economic marginalization, social discrimination, and political
disenfranchisement. Framing hesitancy and resistance as “cultural” beliefs exculpates oppressive
powers and instead suggests distrust is a generationally transmitted norm. Several other terms
used to discuss “cultures” achieve this same illusion of mistrust as normalcy without responding
to the underlying structural inequities. A prominent example was physicians’ references to
wealth and poverty.

The Rich and the Poor
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Culture, to Ms. Foster, was the way people were brought up and the environment that
they lived in, whether that concerned food, clothing, attitude, or religion. Culture was an
individual’s outlook on life and the first thing that they used to help make an impression of
something. Having only recently started working at a West County practice, she had started to
engage more frequently with “transgender and queer culture,” she disclosed. She had almost
never encountered these “cultures” when she previously worked in the city and felt that this
difference was because urban patients “didn't have the time to think about [their] gender identity”
and similar topics. Pausing here, she remarked that she had more thoughts on this matter but did
not wish for these to be recorded in our interview. Moving on, she noted that in the city, she had
seen a group she did not interact with as much anymore:
It was a lot of poor African Americans who just did not have any sort of...not a good
upbringing, but just the education to really make progress in work or something to help
give them more money to get them to where they needed to be. They just seemed that
they were happy. They're all very happy with what they have. But just to me as someone
coming from a place of privilege, it’s hard for me to really mesh with that. And with the
culture out here, it's just a 180-degree difference.

Note that Ms. Foster used the term education, returning to the coded, racialized language
discussed in previous chapters as a way of defining one’s capacity to know in more acceptable
terms. Importantly, in her response, she connected “cultures” with socioeconomic standing,
poverty, and a racial group. In fact, Ms. Foster was not the only respondent to mention wealth, or
lack thereof, in their discussions of patient collectives. Frequently, interviewees would add
financial descriptors like “rich” or “poor” to the categories into which they placed their patients.
Returning to Dr. Greer, for example, she immediately opened her response with a reference to
these groupings. “You know, I have the typical West County affluent people or city affluent
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people,” she stated. Similarly, Dr. Engles noted that most of the patients in her West County
practice came from middle to high socioeconomic backgrounds.
Here, one must ask what aspects of wealth and poverty lend themselves to incorporation
into physicians framing of “culture,” especially as it pertains to the offered definition of culture
as beliefs on normalcy. Dr. Ash’s response presents one possible explanation. During our
conversation, she shared that “we have to understand the culture of a lot of these patients also
have lower socioeconomic status [sic]. They don't have, necessarily, access to certain types of
foods.” By connecting “culture” first to low socioeconomic status and this status then to
limitations on food access, Dr. Ash reinforces the notion that “culture” encompasses the
parameters of “normal,” which in this case is represented by a patient’s usual diet. The state of
normalcy here, food insecurity, acts as a constraint on healthy living, which is to say that this
framing of “culture” suggests that it imposes a restriction on patients’ adherent autonomy. In this
pattern I witnessed repeated throughout my interviews, both “culture” and “cultures” subsumed
any factor that might influence the performance of the affective and technical components of
biomedical care.

Forcing Collectives
I argue that the ambiguity of “culture” coupled with the constraints of patient visits
enable physicians to conflate the notion with the variety of other characteristics I have previously
discussed. These factors, I suggest, are those that are most immediately salient in clinical
encounters. In a 2013 study, anthropologist Linda Hunt asked physicians whether they could tell
her “how [they] know someone’s racial or ethnic group,” finding that “[i]n sharp contrast to the
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confident tone in which most had asserted that race is important, this simple question was most
often met with a nervous laugh, a long pause, or a comment like ‘That’s a good question!’”
(Hunt 2013, 259). When I asked my interviewees towards the end of the interview how they
identified the cultural group to which a patient belonged, I observed a very similar phenomenon.
“When you're with a patient, how do you try to figure out the culture or the cultures that
they are a part of?” I asked during my conversation with Dr. Ash. Here, she shared that she asked
patients about the food that they ate. She found that patients were frequently vague initially,
causing her to often have to “pull it out of them” through a more specific line of questioning.
“But also you have to try and understand where they're coming from,” she stated, presenting her
efforts to understand a patient’s standpoint:
And then I also ask them, "What is their social support at home?" Okay, because if they
live alone, it's going to be very different than if they have a significant other with them or
whatnot. If they've had a friend or a family member that underwent weight loss surgery,
so then they understand the aspects of that. So, kind of those different social perspectives.

Dr. Ash effectively equated “culture” to what she termed “social perspective,” a notion
tied to a patient’s home environment, familial relations, and, ultimately, the components of
knowing and wanting that comprised many of my interviewee’s constructions of adherent
autonomy. More importantly, Dr. Ash suggested that she employed various proxies for “culture”
and “cultures” in the clinical encounter. By this, I mean that Dr. Ash sought to understand and
classify patients’ “cultures” or groups based on their social perspectives, familial support, and
personal histories, all of which are salient due to their function as barriers to the patient’s
functioning as a self-surveilling physician. Dr. Ash was not alone in using similar tools to
diagnose patients’ “cultures.”
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Some physicians, like Dr. Jin, relied less on questions directed at patients and instead
used other demographic information:
I guess in my limited knowledge of that it's more or less just their country of origin. Or,
you know, because I'm an immigrant as well, that's the main thing that drives my view.
But, I suppose even for people who grow up in this country or consider themselves
American, there could be a lot of cultural differences that I don't necessarily think about.

While Dr. Jin employed her own background to identify patients’ “cultures,” she
conceded that there was a breadth of perspectives she did not consider by limiting herself to a
singular characteristic used to create collectives. Note that Dr. Bell too used patients’
nationalities to create collectives, like the Bosnian patients she referenced, because their diet was
different from biomedical recommendations.
My point in displaying these responses is to suggest that the physicians I interviewed
identified patients’ “cultures” in different ways, using varied markers and proxies to categorize
individuals. “Cultures,” then, became constructed in many forms within the clinical space
although their unifying feature was the salience of these diagnostic characteristics to adherent
autonomy. Regardless of the way “cultures” were identified in the clinical space, they were made
relevant by their connections to, and barriers posed to, the achievement of successful dietary
management of chronic disease. “Cultures” thereby became interpreted in much the same way
they were verbalized. Wealth, social standing, family support, education, ethnicity, and race all
became stand-ins for culture in the clinical encounter. This paradigm, I suggest, elucidates a
primary issue with “cultural competence.” In acting as a “rule of thumb” that posits culture is
valuable to each and every clinical encounter, the notion not only permits, but also encourages,
the use of “culture” to explain any patient behavior that challenges the new form of compliance.
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Grasping “Culture” as Abrasion
My physician interviewees’ framing of “culture” as beliefs on normalcy lends itself to an
excessive focus on resistance. Through defining culture as what an individual believes is
appropriate, my interlocutors suggested also that “culture” directs how an individual performs
these convictions, or acts to remain in concert with their beliefs on normalcy. This argument is
not limited to physicians’ answers to my question about their definition of culture. It extends to
their casual use of the term throughout our conversations to explain patient deviance. While
talking to Dr. Ash, for example, I received a response from her in which she discussed
“culture’s” behavioral implications for weight loss:
So, when I talk to patients, I tell them that my surgery is literally just a snapshot in time.
You know, and when I do the surgery, the next day, I'm done. Now it's up to you. And it's
true, like, I don't go home with you. I don't watch, you know, those sorts of things. So
that culture and that home that you live in is so important. Understanding, like, you
know, if you're in a home where everyone else is eating fast food, and you're expected to
eat a healthy diet, and you've eaten fast food all your life, that's going to be very hard to
maintain. Or if you make certain foods for your kids, and you don't alter their lifestyle,
that's going to be very hard. So, I think that because it is so behavioral related, is why it's
so important, because it's so much more than just the surgery.
In Dr. Ash’s response, the salience of “culture” in the clinical encounter came directly from its
impact on resistance to adherence or, more specifically, to the action component of following the
dietary regimen necessary for weight loss. This is not the only response in which “culture” was
suggested to underlie deviant behavior. Dr. Jin’s answers emphasized the way in which cultural
competence promoted the use of “culture” to explain behavior at odds with the biomedical
optimum.
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At one point, my conversation with Dr. Jin meandered to the topic of cultural
competence. To her, cultural competence was about understanding how the way patients were
raised might affect their beliefs about medical treatment or the whole medical system. This was a
skill that physicians were not well-trained in, she shared. As a result, “it's very hard for us to
understand why patients may not comply to a treatment because we don't understand at all what
kind of beliefs they have,” she commented. She explained that she did not feel as though medical
education did a good job of teaching cultural competence despite the recent emphasis on shared
decision-making. It was important to improve this gap because “it can be important if a patient's
set of beliefs are extremely different, and we just cannot understand why they do not take their
medicine.
Dr. Jin’s response further reinforces the idea that culture is made salient in clinical
encounters by the resistive abrasion of normalcy with the biomedical ideal through the
conditionality of her final statement: cultural competence is important if the patient’s beliefs
were different and patients were struggling with adherence. By directly tying cultural
competence to improving patient adherence, she suggests that the path towards “good care” or
successful management of chronic disease must involve understanding “culturally” transmitted
beliefs. In much the same way that other physician interviewees discussed “cultural” distrust of
the medical system, Dr. Jin divorces these beliefs from their specific instigation, from
experiences that might have inspired their creation, or from historical systemic prejudice and
instead ascribes them to the more generalized way that “patients were raised.” In addition, Dr.
Jin suggested that challenges with dietary management of chronic conditions could always be
explained by these “cultural” beliefs. This brings me to another fundamental critique of cultural
competence. In emphasizing, or even overemphasizing, the role of culture in clinical encounters,
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the notion propagates the false belief that culture must permeate each decision, challenge, and
behavior.

Necropolitical Veils
The dangers of believing that “culture” must explain every patient behavior, particularly
behavior at odds with adherent autonomy, lies in its ignorance of structural factors that may limit
patients’ capacity. In a 2006 article, medical anthropologists Arthur Kleinman and Peter Benson
argue that cultural competence unwittingly flattens, problematizes, and implicates culture.
Culture is –in their eyes –a term eluding definition due to its incredibly dynamic nature.
Consequently, the ostensible ability of medical education programs to “teach” physicians about
culture in some easily packageable form appears ludicrous. In fact, Kleinman and Benson go so
far as to argue that culture, when reduced in this way, can have dangerous effects. For example,
they suggest that the attribution of all deviant patient behavior to “radically different cultural
understanding” can conceal contributing factors like low income, time restrictions, and irregular
transportation (Kleinman and Benson 2006, 1673). This assessment is very similar to responses
observed in my own work, where physicians commonly used “culture” and beliefs to rationalize
patients’ inability to know, want, or do.
Cultural competence enables physicians to scapegoat “culture” during matters of patient
compliance or adherence. By reinforcing the nearly automatic assumption that “culture” must be
identified and must play a role in patient-physician interactions, competence allows “culture”
and “cultures” to inaccurately represent patients’ engagement with illness. Primarily, beliefs and
behaviors with concealed structural roots are employed to imprecisely designate patients into
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“cultural” groups. The binding characteristics of these collectives—whether language, poverty,
or race—are centered in explanations of “culture’s” role in making chronic disease management
more difficult. Competence thereby acts as a necropolitical veil, creating imagined and assumed
collectives seemingly bound by “culture.” This excessive focus on ostensible “cultural”
resistance exculpates the structures that reliably discriminate based on these same factors.
Therefore, discrepant outcomes, and the march towards death itself, become shrouded in the
language of choice. An especially pernicious facet of this paradigm is the conflation of culture
with race.

Racial Threads in “Cultural” Fabrics
When speaking about examples of patient groups or “cultures,” physicians used various
terms to highlight qualities that might affect or impede care. As I have illustrated, these
groupings were constructed by comparing their identities and perceived beliefs against ideals of
Western biomedicine. In this way, “cultures” became synonymous with “others,” representing
collective and individual subjectivities different from the dominant perspective. Not only does
this othering problematize and exoticize groups, but it also offers little acknowledgment of the
structural basis for what are ostensibly “cultural” norms.
Throughout discussions of language, nationality, distrust, and poverty, a critical thread
persisted: race. Whether physicians were speaking about one’s country of origin, level of
education, or belief in medical providers, my interviewees incorporated language intertwined
with racial groups. The frequent conflation of culture with race, which Bridges aptly refers to as
the new “culture-qua-race” is worth exploring in more detail (Bridges 2008, 120).
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The Color of Concrete

5

The age of empire is over; apartheid and Jim Crow have been ended; and a significant consensus
exists among scientists (natural and social), and humanists as well, that the concept of race lacks an
objective basis. Yet the concept persists, as idea, as practice, as identity, and as social structure.
Racism perseveres in these same ways (Winant 2006, 987).

The Latency of Race
In each of my interviews, my interlocutor referred to at least one racial group when asked
to describe the cultures they interacted with frequently in their patient population. In Dr. Ash’s
interview, for example, she responded with several mentions of Black patients, a group focused
on by most other physicians as well:
So, I would say about 80...Well, so I think first of all, and this is kind of nationally, about
80% of patients who come into clinic for bariatric surgery are women okay? I would say
probably about 20 to 25% of patients are African American. I would say for us, I think
this is just being in the Midwest—I think it's different if let's say you're on Florida, or
you're in Texas—we do not see a large proportion of Hispanic patients. But again, I think
that's just regional, okay? And so, you know, I think also the Hispanic population due to
cultural things, and as well as African Americans are less likely to seek out bariatric
surgery. They don't see it as something that would be helpful. It's just the culture that is
seen is interesting.

Dr. Ash not only responded to a question about culture with references to racial groups, but also
explicitly tied a culture of mistrust, as we saw other interviewees outline in the previous chapter,
to African-American patients. Culture here not only became explanatory for patient behavior that
was incongruent with the delivery of good biomedical care, but it also became connected with
race. The entire racial group of African-American patients is suggested to possess the same
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culture, which, recall from my previous discussions, interviewees argued was one’s set of beliefs
on “normal.” This conflated concept of “culture-qua-race,” I contend, is a new form of racism.
While one can argue that some of the most heinous colonial manifestations of racism
have long been undone, it is impossible to reasonably suggest that the erasure of these visible
instances has also dismantled the architecture which enabled their creation. Racism persists in
daily microaggressions, larger acts of direct violence, and the perseveration of race as a
legitimized system of thought and classification. The language of race remains ever-present,
existing just below the surface as a latent force “ready to spring into action” through coded
terminology (Amin 2010, 1). In this chapter, I argue that my physician interviewees’ frequent
conflation of culture with race reveals a disguised form of racism whereby race, as an othering
force, remains valid and flourishing in more acceptable ways. I explore discourse on race as a
biopolitical tool of preserving power in order to underscore its resilience in dialogue and thought.
Ultimately, I contend that culture-qua-race is an especially pernicious necropolitical tool because
it allows one to divorce beliefs and behaviors from their origins in structural violence and instead
speak about them in terms of the logic of choice.

Same, But Different
Clinically, Dr. Hanson was an endocrinologist and her research work focused on diabetes
prevention among women who were at risk for gestational diabetes. Some of her work had been
defining screening rates for women, particularly in federally qualified health centers where
women were at risk or loss to follow up because of frustrations with insurance. In addition, Dr.
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Hanson noted that much like her colleague, Dr. Williams, she worked in the transgender center
doing gender-affirming hormone therapy and coordinating care for those patients.
Dr. Hanson frequently discussed food with patients although she remarked that in the
context of a short office visit, it was often challenging to spend significant time providing dietary
counseling. Instead of telling the patient what they should eat, she aimed to understand what
patients were eating, what their common breakfast, lunch, dinner, and snack foods were, and
what they were drinking. While her knowledge on nutrition counseling was something she had
picked up rather than learned, she felt that educational emphases had somewhat changed since
her medical training and noted that she had seen curriculum at her medical school revamped with
a focus on social determinants of health and topics beyond medicine and medicines. “But I never
have as much time as I feel like I need to really [counsel patients] in a thorough manner,” Dr.
Hanson lamented before explaining that in situations where patients more challenging issues, she
would refer them to dietitians with more dedicated time. Most diabetic patients ended up seeing a
dietitian although one of the challenges that they encountered for expanding this service was that
reimbursement had not been supported for people without diabetes and another was a lack of
enough dieticians to match the demand. Dr. Hanson noted that there were programs now through
the YMCA and the National Diabetes Prevention Program that were leading diabetes prevention
initiatives.
When we discussed Dr. Hanson’s impressions of culture, she answered that the term
referred to the constellation of a person's background, their family traditions, their ethnicity, and
things that were important to them in their life. In response to my question about cultures that she
interacted with frequently in her work, Dr. Hanson noted that she had several patients of Middle
Eastern descent. She also had a lot of African American patients and Caucasian patients as well
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as a few of Indian descent. “The vast majority, though,” she explained “are white or Caucasian,”
and, after a pause, added “which obviously can vary in terms of their cultural background.”
Towards the end of our conversation, I once again brought up the topic of culture, this
time hoping to discuss the similarity or difference between race and culture in Dr. Hanson’s
eyes. She replied introspectively:
Oh, that's a really good question. I think they're different. Right? You can have people
who are white who come from different European cultures. You can have people who are
Black who come from different cultures and have different ethnic backgrounds and
different experiences. So, I wouldn't equate them. You know, just thinking back to you
asking about the cultures that my patients come from, I'm recognizing I generalized in
many ways that I probably shouldn't. I wouldn't say that they are the same. I think it's
important to recognize some of those differences.

Dr. Hanson’s responses reflect the ease of equating “cultures” with racial categories, a
certain quickness mirrored by nearly all of my interviewees. Asking about cultures frequently led
to answers filled with races like “white,” “Black,” and “Asian.” However, the moment I asked
about race versus culture, my interlocutors insisted, like Dr. Hanson, that the terms referred to
entirely different concepts. While Dr. Hanson recognized that in her discussion of cultures she
had conflated the notion with racial categories, this acknowledgment only came when I directly
asked her about race and culture. Most physicians, in fact, who had named races did not
demonstrate this retrospective critique of their answer even when they asserted firmly that race
and culture were distinct. What properties allow this phenomenon of dissonance? I argue that
investigating this question of why race and culture can be emphasized as theoretically different
yet applied in nearly equivalent ways in practice is valuable to understanding the maintenance of
new racism. To begin, I examine how my interviewees constructed and argued race in contrast to
culture.
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The “Genetics” of Race
As I have explained at the beginning of this chapter, Dr. Ash was one of the many
physicians I spoke with who presented racial groups when asked for “cultures.” Interestingly
however, in stark contrast to this conflation, Dr. Ash created a firm distinction between the
notions of race and culture when I inquired her directly on the matter towards the end of our
conversation. Did she feel the two concepts were similar or different, I asked. Dr. Ash offered
the following response:
Race is something that, in a way, it’s genetic. Like you are born a certain race, you can't
change that when you walk out the door, you can't hide that, you know. And no matter
what behavior that is, it is what it is. Culture, you can change, right? So, you can change
perspectives on how you see someone of a certain race, or you see someone of a certain
ethnicity. And culture is really our human behaviors, but also our thought processes or
our own biases, our own preconceived notions about people. That's what culture is.

Several key properties were offered by Dr. Ash to explain the difference she perceived between
race and culture, beginning with their mutability. While race was suggested as being genetically
determined, culture was seemingly less decided and more deeply within an individual’s control.
“When you walk out the door,” Dr. Ash said, the fixed nature of race meant one could not alter
the racial category to which they belonged and had belonged to since birth. Their culture, on the
other hand, equivalent to perspectives, thoughts, and, importantly, the behaviors inspired by
these beliefs, could be changed voluntarily. This portrayal of race with biological undertones was
evident in several other interviews as well.
When our conversation turned to culture, Dr. Iver defined the term as one encapsulating
personal beliefs and one’s way of life based on one’s country or region of origin. Asked about
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cultures she interacted with frequently, she responded that she had a large group of AfricanAmerican patients, fewer Hispanic patients than she had seen in Chicago, and fewer Bosnian
individuals than were at the previous university where she had worked. Other than these groups,
it was “mostly white people or Black people,” she shared. At the end of our interview, however,
when our final topic of discussion dealt with the difference or similarity between race and
culture, Dr. Iver responded that she felt race, culture, and ethnicity were all disparate concepts. “I
don’t even know what race really means,” she repeated twice. Pondering out loud, she explained
that she recognized the biological conceptions of race but was unsure about these notions due to
her belief that if someone were to perform genetic comparison between, say, her and an
individual from North County, they would find that there was little difference. When I asked
whether she applied race or culture more, then, in her own work, she took a moment to think.
“That’s a good question,” she said. “When it comes to medicine, we typically have been trained
to apply race more, even though that may not be correct, because that's historically what's been
done. So, the data surround that when you look at diagnoses and epidemiology and things like
that.” Dr. Iver’s response underscores an important point: race has historically been incorporated
into the delivery of biomedical care. The continuing incorporation of race in biomedicine reifies
this constructed system of classification.

Biomedical Reification of Race
The connection between biology and race is one repeatedly debunked throughout history
and yet one that has been sustained in public thought. American sociologist, Troy Duster, argues
in one of his articles that the seemingly biological nature of race is preserved by the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness, where an abstract notion is made to seem more real. He points, for
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example, to genetic studies underlying trials for a drug known as BiDil, marketed as the first
medication for hypertension specifically for African American patients (Duster 2005, 1050). The
basis for many genetic studies, he underscores, is the selection of individuals from various
geographic regions, populations who are picked for “their convenience and accessibility” and
“subtly portrayed as representing racially categorized populations” (Duster 2005, 1050-51).
Since genetic differences are found between any two human groups, even between randomly
selected ones, the specific overlap of these groups with races allows studies to falsely link
genetics with race. Jada Benn Torres, a genetic anthropologist, notes that the interest in
performing these types of studies and the consequent “operationalization of race in biomedicine
persists, in part, due to a changing disease paradigm in which common diseases are the result of
rare genetic variants” (Benn Torres 2019, 38). In this way, biomedicine continues to reify race,
giving weight and structure to a constructed notion that is otherwise an arbitrarily devised
pattern.
The effectiveness of biomedicine at performing this process of legitimization that permits
the easy “slippage between race as innate and race as social,” depends on its hegemonic position
(Whitmarsh 2009, 286). Scientific positivism, which “positions objects of study as readily
observable” and furthermore “presupposes that scientific knowledge is objective, value-free, and
capable of generating universal explanations of ‘reality,’” reinforces biomedicine’s standing
(Pollock et al. 2021, 3). The creation of biomedical knowledge becomes a process of creating
seemingly impartial truth, imbuing it with an incredible sense of biopolitical power that can be,
and repeatedly has been, exploited in the cases of eugenic thought and unethical medical
experimentation like the previously discussed Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments, to name just a
few examples (Rouse 2021, 364). Even today, race is still included as a factor in clinical
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algorithms meant to diagnose patients, suggesting that reification is not only “historically what's
been done” in biomedicine, as Dr. Iver pointed out, but also remains a continuing pattern.
Recently, for example, much controversy has emerged over the persistent use of race in clinical
equations that calculate estimated glomerular filtration rates (eGFRs), which is used to determine
the “[administration] and dosing of medications, [consider] kidney donation and research study
participation for new therapies,” and influence “referral to kidney specialists” (Powe 2020, 737).
In this way, biomedicine not only generates ostensible truth, but it also applies this knowledge
through the necropolitical dynamics of care. By this, I mean that biomedical care begins to apply
both its affective and technical components unequally to individuals, allowing the standards of
good care to be discriminately applied (Sandset 2021, 1413). This violence of how race is
created and interpreted in the biomedical sphere serves to highlight exactly why the creation of
culture-qua-race becomes such a problematic conflation.

The Potency of Culture-Qua-Race
Culture-qua-race is not only a new form of racism but is also an especially efficient tool
used to maintain structures of power. It allows convenient ignorance of the structural violence
that fractures populations into portions allowed to live and portions subjected to slow death
inside and outside of clinical spaces. In other words, culture-qua-race not only allows some to
die, it also reassigns blame for this sinister necropolitical dynamic even more than other factors
used to create “cultural” groupings.
As Bridges points out in Reproducing Race, “commentators relate the higher morbidity
and mortality of Black people to African-Americans’ (indelibly cultural) fear of the medical
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establishment (in the wake of the Tuskegee syphilis study) or Black people’s eating habits
(common to an entire “culture” and impossible to change)” (Bridges 2008, 135). Evident in my
interviews as well, physicians commonly attributed distrust of providers to the “culture” and
beliefs of racial groups. These conflations assign uniform thoughts and behaviors to an
incredibly large group of individuals, assuming and attempting to predict deviance. This practice
exculpates failings of the medical system as well as the pervasiveness of anti-Blackness.
Simultaneously, its distracts from dismantling the true structural roots of health outcomes among
Black patients through a particularly potent necropolitical veil.
“Culture,” a dynamic concept with an air of electability, as Dr. Ash suggested, is used as
a stand-in for the static and quasi-biological grouping of race. From an anthropological
perspective, culture and race began situated as opposites, yet over time, “[c]ulture became
everything race was not, and race was seen to be what culture was not: given, unchangeable,
biology” (Visweswaran 1998, 72). In this way, race became essentialist in both definition and
application, particularly in the clinical setting. The fundamental danger of culture-qua-race is that
it permits race and culture to theoretically maintain these distinct, essential properties yet to be
applied in equivalent ways.
When physicians name racial groups, they invoke a biomedically reified, seemingly
objective category, which, as I have discussed, is continually acted upon by structural forces.
However, in speaking about these races in terms of “culture,” one can exclude structures of
power from discussion and suggest that the less-than-optimal care delivered to some patients is a
result of their own beliefs. Culture-qua-race is thereby harmfully pathologized and employed to
explain and even falsely predict patients’ behavior. The practice enables the illusion of good
care, which is upheld by respect for patient autonomy, without acknowledging that the logic of
82

choice here is perverted by the historical, and continued, oppression of racial groups. Cultural
competence, then, only deepens this dynamic, offering yet another linguistic and practical curtain
to disguise this pseudocare.

Personal Biases
As I have discussed thus far, every single one of my interviewees presented racial
categories when asked for examples of cultures yet also explained race and culture as being very
distinct concepts. While some alluded to the biological reification of race, others acknowledged
that race was entirely a socially-constructed system of categorization. This latter set of
individuals, I found, also presented explanations for how they combatted racism in their daily
work as part of their dedication to “cultural competence.” Investigating these responses allows an
understanding of the rhetoric used to discuss the confrontation of prejudice in clinical
encounters. This exploration is especially valuable to the distinction between personal and
institutional or systemic responsibilities.
One of the last questions I posed to Dr. Engles during our conversation focused on the
difference, or lack thereof, between race and culture. She thought about the terms separately, she
shared, and while there certainly could be a link between the two, one could not assume a
connection:
Rithvik: Could you offer a definition of race? How you see it?
Dr. Engles: Oh, you're asking hard questions. You know, I think race is a social
construct. And it is built on how people are perceived by others, obviously, completely
separate from any biologic, genetic, etc [sic]. All of that has nothing to do with this. But
it's obviously hugely important because of racism, and the structural inequalities that that
causes and perpetuates.
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Rithvik: Got it. And in your own work, do you see yourself applying culture more or race
more when you're talking to patients about food, but also in general?
Dr. Engles: Hm, that’s a really interesting question. I ask about culture. I don't typically
ask about race, although for my own self, you know, I have biases. We all have biases.
And so, I work to mitigate that as best I can. I actually am pretty conscious about my
perceptions and if I perceive race, right, because it is totally socially made up.

Dr. Greer too offered a similar non-genetic, social-construction-based explanation for the
terms when speaking about her work with cultural competence:
Yeah, the problem with race is that it is not a biological term, and it is a sociocultural—
and currently political—term. And so, particularly with my African American patients,
I'm particularly careful to see where they're coming from. But I'm mostly interested in the
standpoint of what their cultural milieu is, in terms of what they can do, and what their
beliefs are with regard to health care, medicine, food, exercise, and what's available,
what's feasible, what's not feasible. And then also, as part of what I've gotten into lately,
in the last year, given all the stuff that's going on in the medical school, and the
Department of Medicine and divisions in terms of diversity, equity, inclusion, and race
theory, and other things, and my reading and the things I've done, the seminars, you
know, trying to be empathetic with regard to people who have a significant stress level.
And actually being aware of the stress level, and then trying to be educated with regard to
things like micro aggressions, and other stuff, both with patients and with staff and
faculty, residents, fellows, etc. It comes up, because we do have a wide population from a
wide variety of backgrounds. And I mean, I have had one time with a fellow who just
said this patient I just saw, you know, was really racist. And I said, you want to talk about
it, you want me to address it? What do you want me to do? They said, “I don't want to
talk about it. Let's just drop it.” But you know, it can be a rather difficult situation.

In both cases, Dr. Engles and Dr. Greer made clear that while race is a socially-created
system of grouping, it is still an important concept with recognizable effects. In particular, they
pointed to racism, each in their own way. While Dr. Engles stated that racism and personal
biases can perpetuate structural inequities, Dr. Greer pointed more specifically to limits on
patients’ capacity and stress levels as a result of microaggressions. Without being prompted, both
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also offered the strategies they themselves were using to address unequal treatment on the basis
of race although neither highlighted any underlying instigators of the biases, microaggressions,
and discriminatory behaviors they sought to confront. Increasingly, the rhetoric of improving
medical care places the onus for addressing inequities on individual providers despite the
institutional and systemic roots of these issues.

Individualized Dismantling
The ability for cultural competence to obscure institutional and systemic violence is
bolstered by the shift in focus to individual providers’ biases. Cultural competence promotes
much self-reflection and confrontation of personal prejudice. While these practices are valuable
and necessary, addressing bias at the individual level is insufficient to apprehend the systemic
roots of these beliefs. While speaking with Dr. Hanson, for example, I asked her what cultural
competence meant. To her, the concept referred to the practice of making sure that she did not
make assumptions about patients and that she recognized her own potential for bias.
Operationally, this looked like starting with open-ended questions and thinking about what was
important to the person in front of her. While this skill was not emphasized early on in her
education, she had noticed a growing focus through lectures, seminars, and trainings. Most of her
exposure to cultural competency training had occurred during her residency in Chicago.
As part of this training, they had done a month-long set of LGBTQ seminars with people
from the community coming in and talking about their experiences trying to obtain health care.
In addition, they had covered homeless medicine and passed out clean needles to people for drug
addictions. More recently she had participated in a bias reduction in internal medicine training at
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her present workplace that focused on ways to recognize personal biases and to interrupt that
bias in clinical encounters. “Do you feel that these trainings achieved their goal?” I asked. No,
the process was a continual one, Dr. Hanson answered. In her perspective, one should never say
that they had “achieved” cultural competence as you could always learn more and correct your
mistakes. The skill was important to rapport building and, without it, creating the patient-doctor
relationship was very difficult.
Dr. Hanson’s answer emphasized the focus cultural competency education placed on
apprehending personal perceptions and correcting these biases, much like Dr. Engles and Dr.
Greer had suggested. This practice is extremely valuable, and I do not mean to detract from its
importance when I critique competence. In Reproducing Race, for instance, Bridges explores the
stereotypes physicians employ in their interactions with patients, finding that doctors commonly
use the generic or oversimplified descriptor we have been exploring thus far, “culture,” to
explain patient behavior. Referencing Hoberman, she writes that “there is nothing intrinsic about
medicine or medical training that should counsel us to believe physicians, as a class, are free
from ‘deep-seated attitudinal biases that parallel those of the general public and the media and
[could] confuse [their] best clinical intentions’” (Bridges 2008, 111).
Despite the pervasive reluctance to acknowledge physician fallibility, accepting that
physicians are privy to the same biases as non-physicians is an important acknowledgment and
improves the therapeutic relationship, as Dr. Hanson pointed out. Simultaneously, however, I
suggest that competence deals only superficially with these false prejudices, centering them on
individual beliefs and not on their systemic roots which too must be considered if competence is
to truly achieve equity. Competence thereby functions as a “happy” semiotic of pseudocare
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satisfied with the illusion of confronting imbalances of power without a real commitment to this
practice.

Happy Language
My question about the meaning of cultural competence stumped Dr. Bell. She
commented again on the difficulty of all the questions and replied that she did not have a good
definition for the phrase. Hoping to pick an easier query, I asked instead whether she found
cultural competence important and whether the institutions she was a part of seemed to
emphasize the skill. She pointed to the recent establishment of a Diversity and Inclusion
committee in the Endocrinology Department as an example of the growing push to make
individuals aware of “different aspects that we should be more sensitive to” and to identify
potential biases. In addition to lectures and presentations, departmental initiatives to promote
cultural competence included surveys, subgroups, and group sessions.
Dr. Bell was not the only physician to mention “diversity” and “inclusion” in their
discussions of cultural competence. The phrases were commonly interspersed in conversations
about both training and application of the skill. When I asked about cultural competence, Dr.
Greer first shared another anecdote about her own cultural “incompetence” to explain her
perspective:
Years and years ago, I made the mistake, I think, of telling a young kid, like a five-year
old—because five-year olds will tell everybody what to do—that they should maybe guilt
trip or encourage their grandparent or parent to do something. And that that did not go
over well, because it was cultural. It was a family and a culture where kids are not
supposed to tell any of their elders what to do. Whereas a lot of the five-year olds I
know...
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Based on her experiences, Dr. Greer believed that cultural competence was valuable to
clinical care because it served as an important step in establishing trust and therapeutic
relationships. Being willing to ask questions to make sure that information was being understood
when translators were in use and inquiring about patients’ thoughts and feelings were important
to ensuring that people knew they were being heard and understood. She then mentioned that the
departments and divisions she was a part of seemed to be placing greater focus on diversity. I
asked what this heightened awareness looked like. Dr. Greer was the lead for a recent set of
workshops, she explained, for a departmental program aimed at bias reduction in internal
medicine. There had been some lectures and several breakout rooms in a virtual environment.
Here, Dr. Greer shared that she was going on vacation next week and that “the whole
thing...It’s been extremely wearing over the last year. And the whole race thing and the whole
pandemic thing have pretty much come together.” She had little notes posted all over her office
with takeaways and reminders, she said, as she looked and pointed to several lightly colored
sheets stuck in assorted locations. Pulling one off the wall next to her computer screen, she read
out, “Diversity is a fact, inclusion is an act,” remarking that she periodically wrote similar
messages down. This entire process was work in progress, Dr. Greer explained. It was a matter
of continuously striving to do better and the more people who were aware of the issues, were
thinking about these problems, and were actually trying to do something, the more momentum
would be generated. It was similar to the challenges women had faced in a variety of fields, she
added. Progress had moved at glacial speed but ultimately things were gradually getting better.
In some ways, diversity and cultural competence are similar notions. No response better
exemplifies this parallel than the one provided by Dr. Donahue. She explained first that cultural
competence was about understanding patients’ cultures and worldviews. While a portion of this
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skill involved factual knowledge about lifestyle and background, most of it involved asking
respectful questions about patients’ views on various topics. Dr. Donahue had been the only
interviewee thus far to note that cultural competence was a term with vacillating popularity. So,
wanting to explore this sentiment, I asked what terms or programs were being introduced as
replacements:
Dr. Donahue: It’s kind of constantly changing from year to year, whether they call it
diversity, equity inclusion, or different little catchphrases of things. In my course, in the
last year, the powers that be focused on more of an anti-racism curriculum than a cultural
competence curriculum. So it’s kind of constantly fluctuating.
Rithvik: Okay. And do you know why that kind of fluctuation exists?
Dr. Donahue: Various social and political pressures I’m sure. And just and what’s going
on, in the times, obviously, the last couple of years, the huge themes nationwide have
been COVID and social injustice related issues.
Knowing about Dr. Donahue’s roles in educating future physicians, I asked Dr. Donahue
whether she emphasized cultural competence with her trainees. She did not use the exact term,
she shared, because she felt it was “gimmicky” instead of being a natural part of patient care.
Consequently, instead of formally teaching the skill, she asked her residents questions when they
brought up concerns with patients not doing what the resident believed they should:
You know, let’s take a step back and consider the differential diagnosis of that. Why is
this patient not picking up their medicines? Why is this patient not following the diet or
exercise plan that you have? So, let's think it through. Can they afford this? Do they have
transportation, they understand why you want them to do this? We certainly encounter
patients who have different cultural views, like whether they will take a COVID vaccine
or not. And distrust of physicians and our medicines and many other more cultural than
strictly medical, scientific kind of issues. So, in primary care, we deal with psychosocial
factors constantly.
While only a small part of her response, Dr. Donahue’s comment on the “gimmicky” nature of
cultural competence – or the many replacement terms she presents – yields insight into the role
of competence as so-called “happy talk.” The language of ostensibly improving medical care,
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filled with “adherence,” “competence,” “diversity,” or similar phrases, only deals superficially
with health inequity. The fluctuating nature of these terms indicates an ongoing effort to respond
to the most politically and socially relevant institutional critiques at any point in time as a
measure of saving face. The hegemonic nature of this practice can be understood from a critical
race theory perspective.

Critical Race Theory
Critical race theory (CRT) is built on several fundamental tenets, each of which describe
a feature of race and/or racism inherent to the way the constructs have been built and employed
historically. The first of these tenets is ordinariness, which suggests that racism is the norm
rather than the exception, allowing scholars of CRT to study racism not as an anomalous
condition, but rather as a “the common, everyday experience of most people of color in this
country” (Delgado and Stefancic 2011, 7). This tenet also helps explain why racism is so
difficult to extinguish: its ordinariness and normality means it is rarely acknowledged and
addressed. Another reason that racism is resistant to erasure is its contribution to the upholding
of the dominant group’s power –a feature termed interest convergence or material determinism.
The ability of racism to advance the interests of “both white elites (materially) and working-class
people (psychically)” means that a significant portion of the population has a vested stake in
maintaining rather than dismantling racism (Delgado and Stefancic 2011, 7).
CRT subscribes to the social constructionist viewpoint, which regards race as a
“[product] of social thought and relations” instead of as “biological or genetic reality,” aligning
with the position espoused by many critics of cultural competency initiatives (Delgado and
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Stefancic 2011, 7) Because race is constructed as opposed to being an inherent quality, CRT sees
it as a dynamic system of categorization, one which is modified at the will of the dominant
group. The will of the dominant group is, in turn, largely attuned to sociopolitical conditions and
capitalistic interests like the changing needs of the labor market. For example, Delgado and
Stefancic compare the differential racialization of Japanese-Americans before and during World
War II to show that “[i]n one era, a group of color may be depicted as happy-go-lucky,
simpleminded, and content to serve white folks” while that same group may later “appear in
cartoons, movies, and other cultural scripts as menacing, brutish, and out of control, requiring
close monitoring and repression” when circumstances change (Delgado and Stefancic 2011,
8).This perspective also takes a critical stance on civil rights progresses throughout the years,
suggesting that these seeming wins have been structured to benefit the dominant group while
appearing to support racial equity.

The Culmination of Pseudocare
In a 2007 paper, sociologists Joyce Bell and Douglas Hartmann use CRT to dissect
individuals’ conceptions of “diversity” through in-depth interviews. Their findings are incredibly
relevant to my own discussion of cultural competence, which too must be seen as “happy talk.”
In their work, Bell and Hartmann discover first that respondents, while ready to describe
diversity, present “underdeveloped” explanations that are internally inconsistent. The abstract
nature of these descriptions is cloaked in an overwhelming sense of positivity, which is to say
that interviewees regularly extoll the virtues of diversity yet are unable to explain why this is the
case when pressed on the matter. More interestingly, the ambiguity of these descriptions is set in
severe contrast to the racial terms used to provide examples when individuals are asked for any
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personal experiences with diversity, a phenomenon very similar to that observed within my own
project. This very discrepancy begins to hint at the problem: diversity and competence allow us
to discuss race without actually discussing race. Bell and Hartmann outline the dangers of this
illusion in their paper:
The diversity discourse, or diversity without oppression, functions to shift the focus away
from an explicit disavowal of race and racial inequalities toward a rhetoric that aspires to
acknowledge and even celebrate racial differences. At the same time, the diversity
discourse conflates, confuses, and obscures the deeper sociostructural roots and
consequences of diversity. In other words, if colorblind racism reproduces racial
inequalities by disavowing race, the diversity discourse allows Americans to engage race
on the surface but disavow and disguise its deeper structural roots and consequences.
Indeed, what makes this diversity discourse so potent and problematic is precisely the
way in which it appears to engage and even celebrate differences, yet does not grasp the
social inequities that accompany them. Furthermore, as Andersen (2001:198) points out,
“diversity taken this way means [certain] people continue to be defined as other.” The
language of diversity both constructs difference as natural and disavows its negative
impact on the lives of those who are so constructed. Race is both everywhere and
nowhere, a deep cultural self-deception that is difficult to identify and counter (Bell and
Hartmann 2007: 910).
Cultural competence functions in much the same way as Bell and Hartmann’s assessment
of diversity discourse. The phrase, and the skill it refers to, permit discussions of culture, race,
and identity without acknowledgment of power and inequity. As Beck and Hartmann point out,
referencing Andersen, phrases like diversity, and our own topic of interest, competence, fall into
this category of “happy sociology,” a field which is not only complacent, but also purposeful, in
its incomplete discussion of culture and race. Andersen suggests that “terms like
multiculturalism and diversity have begun to blunt the [sociological] imagination,” “making it
more difficult to understand the inequalities and injustices associated with race” (Beck and
Hartmann 2007: 910). Cultural competence, in its focus on care as the improvement of patient
adherence, reasserts the value of “culture” only as salient to compliance. In this process, the
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differences of a patient’s “culture: to the biomedical ideal are not only exoticized, but also
pathologized. “Competence” exemplifies the claim that one can grasp all that is culture, a grab
that is wild and uncontrolled, usurping language, race, wealth, ethnicity, and everything that
ostensibly may explain behavior. The issue here is not only the arrogance of such a claim.
Competence permits us explain away inequities and subverts efforts to address their roots by
appearing to rather than committing to care.
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Conclusion

6

“Every view is a view from somewhere and every act of speaking a speaking from somewhere” (AbuLughod 1991, 141).

Overview
In this thesis, I have illustrated the way in which patient behavior is comprehended
against the biomedical ideal, a hegemonic and moralized conception of “good care” and “good
choice.” “Compliance,” while gradually erased from the language of care, continues to be
indirectly enforced through adherent autonomy. This new expectation assesses patients on their
ability to understand chronic disease management, desire to perform the necessary steps, and
their actions sparked by this knowledge and interest. However, patient behavior is conceived of
and spoken about discriminatingly. By this, I mean that patients are classified into assumed
collectives, each of which is bound by characteristics that are thought to direct behavior in a
predicted way. Exploring “cultures” or groups bound by a common “culture,” I discovered that
my physician interlocutors defined these collectives based on conflated traits. They offered
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, education level, and, most pervasively, race as the defining
categorizations for these “cultures.”
“Cultures” thereby usurp and conceal structural factors that contribute to challenges with
management of chronic disease. “Culture” becomes an explanatory necropolitical excuse for
perceived deviance, acting to conceal the systemic roots of beliefs, behaviors, and health
inequities as choice. In particular, I have argued that culture-qua-race is an especially harmful
tool as it relies on a social construction which continues to be reified and legitimized.
Overall, my analysis suggests that improving medical care through “adherence” and “cultural
competence,” not only falls short of its ostensible goals, but also conceals patterns reinforcing
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the very power imbalances it seeks to undermine. All while these “happy” semiotics generate the
dangerous illusion of accommodating patient autonomy and choice, they distract from
imbalances of power. Ultimately, this pseudocare offers an exculpatory vehicle to discuss
resistance without power, personal bias without systemic racism, and death without structural
violence. Some patients are thereby permitted to die inside and outside of clinics as the slow
violence inflicted upon them is normalized and expected even as it is rendered comfortably
invisible to those perpetuating it. In this concluding chapter, I offer extensions of the analysis I
have performed and recommendations to address critiques of cultural competence efforts.

Disciplining Forces: Biopower and Governmentality
A seeming embrace of patients’ freedom to choose, I have shown, has not exempted
patients from continued moral assessment of behavior against biomedical ideals of “good care”
and “good choice.” The creation of adherent autonomy, the composite of patients’ abilities to
know, want, and do, impinges on patients’ practical sovereignty. This deprivation not only
maintains the depersonalization and objectification of individuals, but also functions as a
disciplining force with unequal impacts. By this, I mean that adherent autonomy is a biopolitical
tool used to differentially grade populations on their deservingness. Just as it offers patients
choice, it normalizes surveillance of these choices and, importantly, expects and punishes
deviance discriminatingly. It is critical to recognize, however, that the clinic is not the only
location where this sentiment of controlling and moralizing the logic of choice is performed.
A complete discussion of biopower and necropolitics in the context of dietary
management can be extended to outside the clinic as well since the patient-physician dynamic is
mirrored by the state-citizen encounter (Perlman 2015, 31). In recent times, legislation like soda
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or sugary drink taxes, known as “sin taxes,” which are “corrective taxes on goods that are
thought to be overconsumed,” have increased the focus on paternalism in public health (Allcott,
Lockwood, and Taubinsky 2019, 1557). Proponents of these economic moves argue that a level
of disincentivizing is necessary to dissuade individuals from purchasing and consuming
unhealthy beverages. Critics, however, contend that these measures unfairly punish consumers
from lower socioeconomic statuses without regard for the structural factors which subjugate
individuals in poverty and force them to spend significant portions of their income on food.
Like the arguments that I have presented throughout this thesis, these legislative
measures are diagnostic of adherent autonomy. Consumers are offered choices that are
surveilled, moralized, and, in this case, monetized. The punishments from this assessment of
“good choices” are unequally impactful, exploiting the same structural fractures that they ignore.
My point here is not to suggest that guiding individuals’ choices has no space in medicine
or that ensuring complete and utter autonomy is the way to deliver high-quality care. What then
would be the function of a physician? Instead, I advocate for deeper, more critical consideration
of the way that paternalistic measures and notions like adherent autonomy differentially affect
populations. Disciplining forces discriminate inside and outside the clinic. Different identities are
subject to different levels of surveillance, expectation, and punishment. Therefore, I argue that
the new forms of compliance or adherence I have presented in my work continue to offer only
superficial improvements of care without confronting the systemic roots of these imbalanced
assessments. My exploration of culture has served as just one example to reinforce this
paradigm.
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Performativity and Euphemizing Pseudocare
I have shown that the change from compliance and adherence only redirects attention
from a more critical analysis of deconstructing paternalistic care. Similarly, linguistic maneuvers
like diversity, inclusion, and competence serve only to fabricate an aesthetic of caring to absolve
institutional responsibilities to actually care. My point here is that the interest in euphemizing the
language of biomedical care is a self-exculpatory one, one with the ultimate effect not of
improving health equity, but of making one feel good. This level of institutional performativity is
not only deceptive but is also dangerous in creating an illusion of pseudocare that distracts from
addressing the true drivers of inequity.
Consider here the concept of cultural competence that I have sought to explore through
this ethnographic work and the conflation of various characteristics with culture that I have
shown previously. Keeping these patterns in mind, cultural competence, as a skill in medical
education, offers up the umbrella of culture but permits discussions of socioeconomic status,
linguistic differences, and racial groups, among other factors. In this thesis, I have sought to
highlight how the nonchalance and ubiquity of culture, coupled with the ease of conflating it
with identities, behaviors, and beliefs like distrust with systemic roots allows it to become
exploited as a necropolitical weapon. Structural violence and complex power relations become
disguised as generationally transmitted beliefs on normal, divorced from their instigation.
Just as adherence offers a linguistic euphemism for the new form of compliance found in
adherent autonomy, culture too becomes explanatory and exculpatory. These practices, I argue,
of softening language to conceal or avoid more critical and reflective discussions of power are
dangerous. As Yoosun Park, a professor of social work, points out, “language and discursive
practices are not simply reflections of ideology and the manifestation of power, but active agents
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in the hegemonic process of constructing and maintaining ideology” (Park 2005, 16). This
pattern permits individuals to discriminately die their slow deaths, drawn out by their identities,
and ignored by the mirage of care, or of improving care, that is offered by these linguistic
maneuvers. In this way, I argue that the language of medical care, whether it be adherence, or
competence, or culture, is never as unassuming as it might first appear. The “happy” illusions of
casual language leaves structural roots of inequity untouched as valuable discussions of racial
reification, of systemic violence, and of the biomedical hegemony are all left unspoken.

Views From Somewhere
Many of the problems with cultural competence begin with its incomplete conception of
culture. While the physicians I interviewed framed culture in many ways, a fundamental
similarity in definition argued that the notion referred to one’s perceptions of what was
acceptable or normal. Physicians suggested that culture was a generational worldview, one which
enveloped individuals in a sense of affective comfort, explaining the intensity and resistance of
cultural beliefs. In naming “cultures,” however, physicians borrowed a variety of characteristics
and coded terminology to categorize patients. These insights into physicians’ reveals an
important intersubjective dynamic in the equivalence between “cultures” and “others.” The
salience of features attributed to culture is defined in terms of their difference or their deviance.
For something to be different, of course, it must have a reference against which it must be
compared. My argument has centered on this very reference to suggest that engagements with
culture in the clinical encounter reinforces the hegemony of biomedicine and, furthermore, of
whiteness. Cultural competence only compounds this issue.
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Primarily, as I have shown, “the issue of cultural competency overlooks who exercises
power to define meaning, perspective, and the ‘other’ and how meanings and perspectives
relating to the ‘other’ are often caught up in discourses that uphold whiteness as the default
standard” (Pon 2009, 60-61). “Cultures” are always defined in relation to something and that
“something” is most commonly Western notions of whiteness and, in the clinical setting,
biomedicine’s moralized adherent autonomy. Based on this reality of how “cultures” are
conceived, a push for competence addresses individual biases but fails to acknowledge the ways
in which commonly circulated cultural tropes are colored by the agenda to maintain power
imbalances. Campaigns promoting competence may thereby reify culture as a static body of
thoughts and actions, suffocating the individual for the sake of an imagined many, and conceal
valuable discussions of structural violence.

Final Remarks
Addressing pseudocare requires an attention to deconstructing the performativity of
competence in clinical education programs and moving towards abolitionist medicine. Cultural
competence trainings should more consistently incorporate discussions of systemic imbalances.
Excessively shifting focus to interpersonal bias and to identifying patient “cultures” forces an
emphasis on resistance rather than on the powers that they oppose. Incorporating anthropological
theory into these trainings will allow greater recognition of structural violence inside and outside
the clinic. Particular stress should be placed on dissecting the factors which influence
categorization of patients into “cultures.” While these are only elementary steps, they confront
immediate problems and instigate necessary discussions about the imbalanced view of culture
advanced by competence.
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Appendix
1. How frequently do you discuss food with patients?
2. What are the biggest barriers to discussing food with patients more frequently?
3. In what contexts do you discuss food with patients? (food insecurity, dietary habits, etc.)
4. Throughout your education/training, how much emphasis was placed on discussing food
with patients?
5. What does compliance mean?
6. What are the biggest barriers to patient “compliance” when it comes to the information
you provide them about food?
7. How do you define culture?
8. How does a patient’s culture influence the conversations you have with them about
food?
9. What does it mean to be culturally competent?
10. Do you believe cultural competency is important in a clinical setting?
11. Throughout your education/training, how much emphasis was placed on cultural
competency?
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